Bad news for midstream counterparties of bankrupt oil & gas producers: you may not be able to rely (as much as you might have expected) on covenants “running with the land” to save your contracts from rejection in bankruptcy.

Working with distressed businesses always presents a wide array of challenges. Solving a distressed company’s problems, or your problems with it, rarely is limited to a single legal discipline, set of laws or state or federal policy. When a distressed enterprise is involved, all kinds of interests and policies can and do clash.

This article first appeared in the American Bankruptcy Institute, November, 2014.

Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a fraudulent transfer ruling in TOUSA, Inc.'s chapter 11 case with wide-ranging implications for the financing community. As discussed herein, this decision weakens protections for secured lenders, especially when extending credit to distressed borrowers.

One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.