Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").

One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.

On October 29, 2009, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth District, in Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle, et al., unequivocally ruled that, under California law, directors of either an insolvent corporation or a corporation in the more elusively defined “zone of insolvency” do not owe a fiduciary duty of care or loyalty to creditors. In so ruling, California joins Delaware in clarifying directors’ duties when the corporation is insolvent or in the zone of insolvency.

Background

The bankruptcy court's opinion exemplifies the second guessing that can confront solvency opinion providers and highlights issues that providers should carefully vet with experienced legal counsel.