On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

新疆某上市公司（下称“公司”）因信息披露违规被中国证监会行政处罚，引发众多股民对公司提起证券虚假陈述民事赔偿诉讼（下称“本案”），金杜代理公司应诉。近期，新疆某中级法院就本案作出一审判决，驳回股民全部诉讼请求。

本案系典型的证券虚假陈述民事赔偿诉讼。该类案件因涉及股民众多、索赔金额高、专业性强，往往引发资本市场高度关注。从以往的案例来看，上市公司被行政处罚后引发的股民诉讼，法院判决驳回原告全部诉讼请求的案例极为罕见。本案中，金杜基于以往处理类似案件的丰富经验和专业把握，针对本案的案情特点，有针对性地提出了上市公司不应承担股民损失的答辩意见，最终得到法院支持。这是金杜代理上市公司成功应对股民提起证券虚假陈述民事赔偿诉讼的又一经典案例。

案情简介

2014年7月，中国证监会作出《行政处罚决定书》，认定公司连续多年虚构购销业务，虚增业务收入与成本，虚增或者虚减利润，导致公司2006年至2011年年报存在信息披露违规问题。

截止目前，本案共有70余名股民对公司提起证券虚假陈述民事赔偿诉讼，此外，还有批量股民以律师函的方式向公司进行索赔。

本案主要争议焦点及金杜整体应对思路

On January 17, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., 1 ruling that Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (the “Act”), prohibits only non-consensual amendments to core payment terms of bond indentures.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.¹  The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles.  GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.

The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. ^[1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.

Background

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.

On 31 March, 2015, the Supreme People’s Court issued four model cases, including Shagang LLC. (Shagang) v. Kaitian LLC.(Kaitian), a case in relation to an objection to enforcement of a distribution plan. In the case, the Court has referred to the Deep Rock Doctrine originated from the United States, states for the first time that shareholders whose capital contribution is insufficient shall be subordinated to external creditors of the company with respect to their payable debts.

On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark  licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a  debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of  intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et  al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).

Earlier this year, we reported on a decision limiting a secured creditor's right to credit bid purchased debt (capping the credit bid at the discounted price paid for the debt) to facilitate an auction in Fisker Automotive Holdings' chapter 11 case.¹ In the weeks that followed, the debtor held a competitive (nineteen-round) auction and ultimately selected Wanxiang America Corporation, rather than the secured creditor, as the w