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It is not uncommon for contractors, in several industry sectors, to contract with a special purpose vehicle (SPV), whose day-to-day management is effectively controlled by a parent company, and the SPV has with little to no assets beyond cash flow provided by its parent. In this article we look at what a claimant could do outside of the traditional insolvency process in circumstances where the SPV goes into a form of external administration such as administration or liquidation and there are no assets available to the external administrators.

In the recent decision of Re PBS Building (Qld) Pty Ltd [2024] QSC 108, the Supreme Court of Queensland considered for the first time the operation of the State’s new project and retention trust account regime in the context of an insolvency. The decision provides useful guidance to insolvency practitioners and subcontractors as to their rights in relation to trust accounts established by an insolvent head contractor.

The High Court of Australia’s decision in Wells Fargo Trust Company, National Association (as Owner Trustee) & Anor v VB Leaseco Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) & Ors (the “Willis” case).

On Wednesday, 16 March 2022, the High Court of Australia handed down its decision in the Willis case.

Following our previous alert here on Justice Middleton’s decision in Wells Fargo Trust Company, National Association (trustee) v VB Leaseco Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed),[1] the administra

On 14 May 2015, Australia acceded to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (“Cape Town Convention”) and the Protocol to the Cape Town Convention (“Cape Town Protocol”). In particular, for insolvency related proceedings, Australia adopted what is known as “Alternative A” in aviation industry speak. The Cape Town Convention became effective as Australian law on 1 September 2015 and applies to the relevant aviation leasing and financing transitions entered into after that date.

Before soliciting votes on its bankruptcy plan, a chapter 11 debtor that has filed for bankruptcy typically must obtain court approval of its disclosure statement. As part of the disclosure-statement approval process, interested parties are afforded the opportunity to object. For example, a party may object on the grounds that the disclosure statement lacks sufficient information about the debtor. Sometimes, however, a party objects to the disclosure statement because the chapter 11 plan described by the statement cannot be confirmed.

The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.

In Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall, a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith, lost by a 5-4 margin Round 2 of its Supreme Court bout with the estate of E. Pierce Marshall in a contest over Vickie's rights to a portion of the fortune of her late husband, billionaire J. Howard Marshall II. The dollar figures in dispute, amounting to more than $400 million, and the celebrity status of the original (and now deceased) litigants may grab headlines.

Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.