The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee (“the Committee”) has endorsed the passing of the Bankruptcy Amendment (Enterprise Incentives) Bill 2017 (“the Bill”) in its report dated 21 March 2018.[1]

The Queensland Court of Appeal has upheld an appeal by the liquidators of Linc Energy Limited (In Liquidation) (“Linc”) and given full effect to their disclaimer of contaminated mining property and onerous obligations the subject of an environmental protection order (“EPO”) issued by the Queensland Department of Environment and Science (“DES”).[1]

On 28 March 2017, the Turnbull Government released draft legislation which would implement wide-ranging reforms to Australia’s corporate restructuring laws. The draft legislation focuses on reforms to the insolvent trading prohibition (Safe Harbour) and introducing a new stay on enforcing “ipso facto” clauses during certain restructuring procedures (Ipso Facto).

I. Introduction

Sophisticated real estate lenders spend significant amounts of time and energy attempting to insulate themselves from potential bankruptcy filings by their borrowers. A primary reason, which many an experienced real estate lender has found out the hard way, is the risk that a debtor in bankruptcy may “cram down” a plan of reorganization over its lender’s objection. Under a typical cramdown plan, a debtor may stretch out payments to its secured creditor for several years and attempt to replace its negotiated interest rate with a new, below- market rate of interest.

On August 26, 2014, Judge Robert D. Drain of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a bench ruling in In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (RDD), on several aspects of the plan of reorganization filed by debtor Momentive Performance Materials, Inc., a specialty chemicals manufacturing company, and its affiliated debtors.

In a decision handed down earlier today, in Willmott Growers Group Inc v Willmott Forests Limited (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in liquidation) [2013] HCA 51,  the majority of the High Court upheld the Victorian Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the liquidators of an insolvent landlord can disclaim a lease, thereby extinguishing the tenant’s leasehold interest.

The absolute priority rule ordinarily prevents a Chapter 11 debtor from distributing any money or property to junior creditors and old equity investors unless all senior creditors have first been paid in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). Nevertheless, old equity investors may attempt to receive new equity in the reorganized debtor in consideration for providing new (post-bankruptcy) investments in the debtor.

Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(10) provides that in order for a plan proponent to “cram down” - i.e., force acceptance of - a plan of reorganization on a dissenting class of creditors, at least one impaired class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. Because a plan is often not accepted by all classes entitled to vote, the ability to procure at least one impaired, accepting class in order to cram down a dissenting class is essential in achieving plan confirmation.

The Bankruptcy Code provides a number of “safe harbors” for forward contracts and other derivatives. These provisions exempt derivatives from a number of Bankruptcy Code provisions, including portions of the automatic stay,1 restrictions on terminating executory contracts,2 and the method for calculating rejection damages.3 The safe harbor provisions also protect counterparties to certain types of contracts from the avoidance actions created under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, such as the preference and fraudulent transfer statutes.4