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It has long been the law that creditors are rarely entitled to contractually prohibit a debtor from filing for bankruptcy, whether such restriction is contained in the debt instruments or in the corporate governance documents. In contrast, governance provisions which condition a bankruptcy filing on the vote or consent of certain equity holders that are unaffiliated with any creditor are frequently enforced. Many equity sponsors, for example, wear two hats: they are both shareholders and lenders to their portfolio companies.

In Nortel Networks, Inc., Case No. 09-0138(KG), Doc. No. 18001 (March 8, 2017), the Delaware Bankruptcy Court ruled on the objections of two noteholders who asked the Court to disallow more than $4.4 million of the $8.1 million of the fees sought by counsel to their indenture trustee. Given the detailed rulings announced by the Court, the decision may establish a number of guidelines by which future fee requests made by an indenture trustee’s professionals will be measured.

Matters Handled by the UCC

“The question that he frames in all but words

Is what to make of a diminished thing.”

                             Robert Frost, “The Oven Bird”

Before soliciting votes on its bankruptcy plan, a chapter 11 debtor that has filed for bankruptcy typically must obtain court approval of its disclosure statement. As part of the disclosure-statement approval process, interested parties are afforded the opportunity to object. For example, a party may object on the grounds that the disclosure statement lacks sufficient information about the debtor. Sometimes, however, a party objects to the disclosure statement because the chapter 11 plan described by the statement cannot be confirmed.

In a significant expansion of the potential risk for distressed claims traders, the Delaware bankruptcy court has recently ruled1 that traders who engage in insider trading may have their claims subordinated to equity, and that traders who amass claims sufficient to block a plan of reorganization owe fiduciary duties to all other creditors and shareholders during plan negotiations.

The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.

In Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall, a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith, lost by a 5-4 margin Round 2 of its Supreme Court bout with the estate of E. Pierce Marshall in a contest over Vickie's rights to a portion of the fortune of her late husband, billionaire J. Howard Marshall II. The dollar figures in dispute, amounting to more than $400 million, and the celebrity status of the original (and now deceased) litigants may grab headlines.

Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.

Rehabilitating a debtor’s business and maximizing the value of its estate for the benefit of its various stakeholders through the confirmation of a chapter 11 plan is the ultimate goal in most chapter 11 cases. Achievement of that goal, however, typically requires resolution of disagreements among various parties in interest regarding the composition of the chapter 11 plan and the form and manner of the distributions to be provided thereunder.