In the matter of Bleecker Property Group Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) [2023] NSWSC 1071, appears to be the first published case that considers the question of whether an order can be made under section 588FF(1)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) by way of default judgment against one defendant where there are multiple defendants in the proceedings.
Key takeaways
This week’s TGIF considers Hundy (liquidator), in the matter of 3 Property Group 13 Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2022] FCA 1216, in which the Federal Court of Australia granted leave under rule 2.13(1) of the Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 (Cth) (FCCR) for intervening parties to be h
The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.
In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).
The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.
Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.
In a recent case, Emmett AJA of the Supreme Court of New South Wales refused to make an order to terminate the winding up of an incorporated association. In this article, we re-examine the principles with which the Court will have regard when determining whether to exercise its discretion to terminate the winding up of a company or incorporated association.
Background
A company’s non-compliance with a statutory demand is the most common method of proving its insolvency in any winding up proceedings. Generally, if it does not make good the debt under the statutory demand within 21 days of service, the company will be presumed to be insolvent. What can a company do if it disputes the legitimacy of the debt?
The basics – compulsory winding up and statutory demands
The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.