Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

Further to our previous article, which can be found here, we consider the key issues with which the Court faced, the technical legal analysis underpinning this judgment and our view on what this may mean for energy suppliers, and the sector as a whole, looking forward.

Background - what was the application and why was it needed?

In a recent decision in the Admiralty Court before Mr Admiralty Registrar Davison, the Court considered the application of the recently enacted section 233B of the Insolvency Act 1986. Whilst the conclusions reached on that provision are perhaps less surprising given its wide remit, the decision raises some interesting points for contract lawyers on the formation of contracts and the reasonableness of their terms.

Introduction – Section 233B of the Insolvency Act 1986 (Act)

Following the Government's announcement in March that the hotly anticipated changes to the UK's insolvency regime would be rushed through Parliament with further, temporary, provisions to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, insolvency practitioners and business professionals alike have been awaiting further clarity on what the Business Secretary's comments mean for businesses both in the current climate and more generally.

The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).

The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.

Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.

The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.