Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

It is clear that there are going to be incredible impacts to businesses and companies of all sizes as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. No business will be immune to the impact of this health epidemic. Across the globe, governments have responded in various ways to change insolvency laws in an attempt to provide assistance to those businesses affected directly or indirectly by COVID-19. Australia is no different and the Federal and State Governments have responded quickly to the crisis.

The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).

The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.

Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.

On 21 September 2018, the Supreme Court of Western Australia Court of Appeal delivered the eagerly anticipated decision in Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers Appointed)1. The appeal decision has come down on the side of what many considered to be the correct position for set off compared to the findings in the first Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers Appointed)2 case.

On 1 July 2018, the stay on ipso facto clauses introduced by the Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Act 2017 (Act) came into effect and will apply to contracts entered into on or after that date. The Act, left a number of issues up in the air which were expected to be filled by regulations. Those regulations, and a declaration, were released in late June 2018, providing little time for contracting parties, and their advisors, to understand how the new laws would impact them before their commencement.

The Stay

The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.