On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, which had approved the structured dismissal of the Chapter 11 cases of Jevic Holding Corp., et al. The Court of Appeals first held that structured dismissals are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, and then upheld the structured dismissal in the Jevic case, despite the fact that the settlement embodied in the structured dismissal order deviated from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.
In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:
On August 26, 2014, Judge Robert D. Drain of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a bench ruling in In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (RDD), on several aspects of the plan of reorganization filed by debtor Momentive Performance Materials, Inc., a specialty chemicals manufacturing company, and its affiliated debtors.
Dealing a major blow to the trustee’s efforts to recover fraudulent transfers on behalf of the bankruptcy estate of the company run by Bernard Madoff, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held in SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC1 that the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used to recover fraudulent transfers of funds that occur entirely outside the United States.
The absolute priority rule ordinarily prevents a Chapter 11 debtor from distributing any money or property to junior creditors and old equity investors unless all senior creditors have first been paid in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). Nevertheless, old equity investors may attempt to receive new equity in the reorganized debtor in consideration for providing new (post-bankruptcy) investments in the debtor.
Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(10) provides that in order for a plan proponent to “cram down” - i.e., force acceptance of - a plan of reorganization on a dissenting class of creditors, at least one impaired class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. Because a plan is often not accepted by all classes entitled to vote, the ability to procure at least one impaired, accepting class in order to cram down a dissenting class is essential in achieving plan confirmation.
The Bankruptcy Code provides a number of “safe harbors” for forward contracts and other derivatives. These provisions exempt derivatives from a number of Bankruptcy Code provisions, including portions of the automatic stay,1 restrictions on terminating executory contracts,2 and the method for calculating rejection damages.3 The safe harbor provisions also protect counterparties to certain types of contracts from the avoidance actions created under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, such as the preference and fraudulent transfer statutes.4
The Issue
The issue is whether the insolvency of a borrower under a non-recourse loan can trigger recourse liability for itself and its “bad boy,” non-recourse carve-out guarantors.
The Issue
The issue is whether the insolvency of a borrower under a non-recourse loan can trigger recourse liability for itself and its “bad boy,” non-recourse carve-out guarantors.
In what it described as “an easy decision,” the U.S. Supreme Court issued its eagerly anticipated decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank1 on May 29, 2012.