The High Court recently issued its ruling in the matter of Re Avanti Communications Limited (in administration). It is the first major case since the pivotal 2005 House of Lords decision of Re Spectrum Plus to examine the characteristics of fixed and floating charges.
Key points
In the current times of financial stress, a borrower seeking to renegotiate or refinance existing financing arrangements may be asked by its lender to enhance or refresh its security package through the grant of a new floating charge.
The question of whether a floating charge can be avoided due to section 245 of the Insolvency Act 1986 ("IA 1986") can arise in such a context.
Void floating charges under section 245 of the IA 1986
What is the so-called "creditor duty"?
This is the duty, introduced into English common law by the leading case of West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd1 in 1988, of company directors to consider, or act in accordance with, the interests of the company's creditors when the company becomes insolvent, or when it approaches, or is at real risk of insolvency.
Background
On 22 July 2022, the English High Court sanctioned Houst Limited’s (“Houst” or the “Company”) restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”), which significantly, is the first time a Restructuring Plan has been used to cram down HM Revenue & Customs (“HMRC”) as preferential creditor.1
Background
The issue
A "no action" clause will appear in almost all English law-governed bond trust deeds.
A no action clause provides that a bondholder (or anyone entitled to payments on the bonds) cannot, initially, proceed directly against the issuer. Instead, the right to bring a cause of action resides with the trustee and it is only if the trustee, having become bound to take action, fails to do so within a reasonable time (with the failure continuing) that a bondholder can then itself proceed directly against the issuer.
On 12 January 2022, the English High Court granted Smile Telecoms Holdings Limited’s (“Smile” or the “Company”) application to convene a single meeting of plan creditors (the super senior creditors) to vote on the Company’s proposed restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”). It is the first plan to use section 901C(4) of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) to exclude other classes of creditors and shareholders from voting on the Restructuring Plan on the basis that they have no genuine economic interest in the Company.
Background
On the 19th of August 2021, the English High Court sanctioned a Part 26A restructuring plan proposed by the administrators of Amicus Finance plc (in administration) (“Amicus”) for the company’s solvent exit from administration, enabling the company to be rescued as a going concern (the “Restructuring Plan”).
On 29 September 2021, the English High Court rejected a challenge in respect of Caff Nero's company voluntary arrangement ("CVA"), brought by a landlord on the grounds of material irregularity and unfair prejudice. The single disgruntled landlord, with the backing of the EG Group ("EG") (who were interested in acquiring Caff Nero), argued that the directors of the company and the CVA nominees breached their respective duties in refusing to adjourn or postpone the electronic voting process to vote on the CVA, after EG had submitted an eleventh-hour offer for Caff Nero.
The High Court has, for the first time since the introduction of the legislation in June 2020, refused to sanction a cross-class cram-down restructuring plan under Part 26A of the Companies Act. In In the matter of Hurricane Energy Plc [2021] EWHC 1759 (Ch), the court rejected a plan supported by bondholders because it had not been shown that the opposing shareholders had no better alternative prospects (i.e., the ‘no worse off condition’ had not been met).