On January 17, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued a decision holding that “impairment” under a plan of reorganization does not arise even if a creditor is paid less than it would be entitled to under its contract, so long as the reduced recovery is due to the plan’s incorporation of the Bankruptcy Code’s disallowance provisions.

Intercreditor agreements between secured creditors are intended to limit the potential for litigation and result in predictable commercial outcomes with respect to recoveries from collateral in enforcement actions and bankruptcies. Despite the extensive drafting efforts of sophisticated counsel to eliminate ambiguities in these agreements, the interpretation of intercreditor agreements has been the subject of substantial bankruptcy litigation.

On November 8, 2018, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) issued a decision dismissing an involuntary chapter 11 case filed against Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. (“Taberna”), a CDO, by holders of non-recourse notes (the “Petitioning Creditors”).

In a recent case, Emmett AJA of the Supreme Court of New South Wales refused to make an order to terminate the winding up of an incorporated association. In this article, we re-examine the principles with which the Court will have regard when determining whether to exercise its discretion to terminate the winding up of a company or incorporated association.

Background

Parties involved in cross-border bankruptcy/restructuring situations may be wary of the risk that repeated litigation in different courts with jurisdiction over the same debtor will result in conflicting judgments. The principle of “universalism” is the theory whereby the decisions of one primary jurisdiction addressing a debtor’s bankruptcy/restructuring issues are given universal effect by courts in other jurisdictions.

Receiverships usually arise from a secured creditor exercising their rights under a loan contract or mortgage following a default. But even where no default occurs, the Supreme Court of New South Wales has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to preserve the property of an association pending the resolution of a dispute about the management of the association’s property.

Jurisdiction

On September 21, 2018, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve the nonconsensual third-party releases contained in the debtor’s plan of reorganization. The District Court also dismissed as equitably moot all other issues raised on appeal by the appellant in connection with the confirmation order.

The consummation of a plan of reorganization typically involves a series of complex actions by the debtor and its stakeholders (for example, existing debt and equity are extinguished and new debt and equity issued in their place). If an appeal of a confirmation order is taken, and the appeal reaches the appellate court following consummation of the plan, it raises the difficult question of whether it is possible to grant effective relief to the appellant at that stage. As a constitutional matter, courts — including appellate courts — cannot hear matters that have become moot.

A company’s non-compliance with a statutory demand is the most common method of proving its insolvency in any winding up proceedings. Generally, if it does not make good the debt under the statutory demand within 21 days of service, the company will be presumed to be insolvent. What can a company do if it disputes the legitimacy of the debt?

The basics – compulsory winding up and statutory demands

Prior to March 2017, any right to sue that comprised an asset of a bankrupt’s estate could only be litigated by the trustee of the bankrupt. The inability of a trustee to assign a bankrupt’s cause of action resulted in many such actions not being litigated due to factors such as a lack of resources. This position changed through the insertion into the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) in Schedule 2 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Bankruptcy), which expressly permits a trustee to assign to a third party any right to sue that is held by of a bankrupt estate (see section 100-5).