In its much anticipated decision, the High Court has unanimously dismissed the Amerind appeal.[1] This decision finally resolves recent uncertainty as to the proper application of trust assets in the liquidation of an insolvent corporate trustee.

In short, the High Court’s decision confirms that in the winding up of a corporate trustee:

The significance of this decision

On 3 May 2019, the Federal Court of Australia dismissed an application brought by the administrators of an oil and gas exploration company, Paltar Petroleum Limited (Paltar) to adjourn proceedings for the winding-up of the company in insolvency. The decision illustrates that the belated appointment of administrators appointed by directors in response to pending winding-up proceedings is unlikely to keep at bay the approaching fire of liquidation; indeed, it may accelerate it.

Background

On February 25, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision holding that a trustee is not barred by either the presumption against extraterritoriality or by international comity principles from recovering property from a foreign subsequent transferee that received the property from a foreign initial transferee.

On January 17, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued a decision holding that “impairment” under a plan of reorganization does not arise even if a creditor is paid less than it would be entitled to under its contract, so long as the reduced recovery is due to the plan’s incorporation of the Bankruptcy Code’s disallowance provisions.

Intercreditor agreements between secured creditors are intended to limit the potential for litigation and result in predictable commercial outcomes with respect to recoveries from collateral in enforcement actions and bankruptcies. Despite the extensive drafting efforts of sophisticated counsel to eliminate ambiguities in these agreements, the interpretation of intercreditor agreements has been the subject of substantial bankruptcy litigation.

On November 8, 2018, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) issued a decision dismissing an involuntary chapter 11 case filed against Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. (“Taberna”), a CDO, by holders of non-recourse notes (the “Petitioning Creditors”).

Parties involved in cross-border bankruptcy/restructuring situations may be wary of the risk that repeated litigation in different courts with jurisdiction over the same debtor will result in conflicting judgments. The principle of “universalism” is the theory whereby the decisions of one primary jurisdiction addressing a debtor’s bankruptcy/restructuring issues are given universal effect by courts in other jurisdictions.

The Federal Court has confirmed that there is no difference between liquidation and deed administration of a corporate trustee in relation to dealings with trust assets and the distribution of proceeds of those assets for the benefit of creditors.

Background

Manpak operated as the trustee for the MP Unit Trust, which carried on the business of a product wholesaler. Under the Trust Deed, Manpak would be disqualified from holding office if it suffered an Event of Default, which included the appointment of an administrator.

On September 21, 2018, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve the nonconsensual third-party releases contained in the debtor’s plan of reorganization. The District Court also dismissed as equitably moot all other issues raised on appeal by the appellant in connection with the confirmation order.

The consummation of a plan of reorganization typically involves a series of complex actions by the debtor and its stakeholders (for example, existing debt and equity are extinguished and new debt and equity issued in their place). If an appeal of a confirmation order is taken, and the appeal reaches the appellate court following consummation of the plan, it raises the difficult question of whether it is possible to grant effective relief to the appellant at that stage. As a constitutional matter, courts — including appellate courts — cannot hear matters that have become moot.