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Earlier this year, we covered Judge Shelley Chapman’s ruling in the Sabine bankruptcy, permitting the Debtors to reject a handful of gathering and other midstream agreements. Previously, Judge Chapman permitted rejection on the grounds that the Debtors exercised their reasonable business judgement in doing so.

In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.

On January 4, 2016, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) deviated from SDNY precedent and held that, despite the absence of clear Congressional intent, the avoidance powers provided for under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code can be applied extraterritorially. As a result, a fraudulent transfer of property of a debtor’s estate that occurs outside of the United States can be recovered under Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court “may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).  In the Caesars bankruptcy, the Seventh Circuit explored the breadth of a court’s rights to take action under this section.  The Seventh Circuit held that section 105(a) permits the Bankruptcy Court to issue an injunction with respect to litigation pending against the debtors’ non-debtor parent.

On December 14, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that claims arising from securities of a debtor’s affiliate must be subordinated to all claims or interests senior or equal to claims of the same type as the underlying securities in the bankruptcy proceeding.

When is a foreign entity eligible to file a chapter 15 petition?  This question has been the subject of debate over the last few years, and Judge Martin Glenn’s recent opinion in In re Berau Capital Resources Pte Ltd. will add to this debate.  Although the debtor in the case was foreign and did not have a place of business in the United States, Judge Glenn concluded that the debtor had satisfied the eligibility provisions under section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code because the New York choice of law and forum selection clause in the underlying bond indenture rendered the

On October 28, 2015, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) issued a decision that significantly expands the jurisdictional bases that foreign issuers can rely upon to obtain relief in the United States under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In a blow to the Lehman Chapter 11 estates, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held on September 16, 2015 that Intel Corporation’s Loss calculation resulting from a failed transaction under an ISDA Master Agreement was appropriate.1 The decision is significant both because of the dearth of judicial interpretation of the ISDA mechanics regarding the calculation of early termination amounts, and because it affirms the general market understanding that a non-defaulting party has broad discretion in calculating “Loss,” so long as its

On June 29, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, which held that claims asserted by counterparties in relation to bilateral repurchase agreements do not qualify for treatment as customer claims under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”).

In a May 4, 2015 opinion1 , the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court order denying confirmation of a chapter 13 repayment plan is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. The Supreme Court found that, in contrast to an order confirming a plan or dismissing a case, an order denying confirmation of a plan neither alters the status quo nor fixes the rights and obligations of the parties. Although the decision arose in the context of a chapter 13 plan, it should apply with equal force to chapter 11 cases.