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It always amazes me when, after more than a half-century of Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) jurisprudence, an issue one thinks would arise quite commonly appears never to have been decided in a reported case. Such an issue was recently decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in an adversary proceeding in the Pettit Oil Co. Chapter 7 case.[1]

Can another vain attempt to mitigate a $1.5 billion mistake provide the occasion for a thorough review of the doctrine of earmarking? It did for Southern District Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn in the long tail on the General Motors bankruptcy case.

Although it may be difficult to define precisely what an “executory contract” is (with the Bankruptcy Code providing no definition), I think most bankruptcy lawyers feel how the late Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously felt about obscenity--we know one when we see it. Determining that a patent license was executory in the first place was an issue in the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in RPD Holdings, L.L.C. v.

As part of its toolkit to improve rescue opportunities for financially-distressed companies, the Government has announced that:

"Companies will be supported through a rescue process by the introduction of new rules to prevent suppliers terminating contracts solely by virtue of a company entering an insolvency process."

The right to terminate contracts on this basis is already restricted for supplies of essential utilities and IT services. However, this only affects quite a narrow range of suppliers.

The Government has announced that it will legislate to prohibit the enforcement of certain contractual termination clauses ('ipso facto clauses').

As with other aspects of the response to recent insolvency and corporate governance consultations, this has given us pause for thought.

In hindsight, it seems inevitable that constitutional and other jurisdictional problems would arise when Congress, in enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, created impressive new powers and responsibilities for the bankruptcy courts (along with a considerable degree of independence) but denied them the status of Article III courts under the Constitution (by denying its judges lifetime tenure, as Article III requires). And it didn’t take long for the problems to arise.