Two recent cases out of the Third Circuit and the Southern District of New York highlight some of the developing formulas US courts are using when engaging with foreign debtors. In a case out of the Third Circuit, Vertivv. Wayne Burt, the court expanded on factors to be considered when deciding whether international comity requires the dismissal of US civil claims that impact foreign insolvency proceedings.

国有企业重组是指通过收购、划转、合并、分立、资产剥离、混改（包括科改）等方式，对国有企业进行重新组织，以实现资源优化配置、企业整体竞争力提升的效果。其中，公司分立是一种常见的重组模式，多适用于分拆上市、解决同业竞争、突出主营业务等场景。笔者结合近期项目经验，就国有企业以分立方式实施重组所涉及的相关法律问题进行探讨。

一、公司分立的基本流程及国企分立特别程序

根据《关于做好公司合并分立登记支持企业兼并重组的意见》（工商企字〔2011〕226号）第二条[1]，公司分立是一个公司分成两个或两个以上的公司，包括存续分立和新设分立两种形式。存续分立是一个公司分立成两个以上公司，本公司继续存续，同时设立一个及以上新的公司。新设分立是一个公司分立为两个及以上新的公司，本公司解散。无论采用哪种形式的分立，公司分立前的债务均由分立后的公司承担连带责任。公司分立的常规流程包括制定分立方案、通过分立决议、编制资产负债表和财产清单、签订分立协议、公告及通知债权人及办理公司分立登记。将于2024年7月1日施行的新修订《公司法》增加了“国家企业信用信息公示系统”作为公告的平台（不再仅限于登报公告），其余关于分立的规定并无实质性变化。

在我国商事实践中，由于清算相关主体未必能严格履行清算义务，以及解散清算制度本身的不完备性等原因，导致存在大量公司自行解散清算并注销，却仍遗留部分债务未处理的情况。此时债务人的公司法人人格已经终止，不再是民事责任承担主体，债权人只能选择其他主体主张权利，这无疑增加了债权追偿的难度，在司法实践中引发了大量争议。

2024年7月1日，新《公司法》即将实施，新法一方面对现行的解散清算制度进行了优化，明确了以董事为主的清算主体责任；另一方面则强化了股东的出资责任，特别规定股东的最长认缴出资期限为五年，且要求存量公司逐步调整至该期限内，这预计将引发大量未实缴出资的公司通过解散清算程序进行注销，从而带来更多公司注销后遗留债务的追偿难题。基于这种新形势，笔者根据近年来代理不良债权追偿项目的经验，梳理并归纳了对遗留债务的追偿路径，以期为面临类似情况的债权人提供参考和借鉴。

一、《公司法》修订与遗留债务的追偿现状

When a majority of a company’s board approves a tender offer in good faith, can it still be avoided as an actually fraudulent transfer? Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, holding that the fraudulent intent of a corporation’s CEO who was a board member and exercised control over the board can be imputed to the corporation, even if he was the sole actor with fraudulent intent.

Background

Recently, in In re Moon Group Inc., a bankruptcy court said no, but the district court, which has agreed to review the decision on an interlocutory appeal, seems far less sure.

近年来，金融机构债权人委员会（以下称“金融债委会”）越来越多地参与到大型、知名企业的金融债务重组案例中。实践中，多数金融债委会都会以协议或决定的方式确立 “一致行动原则”。这一原则对金融机构债权人的影响如何？金融机构债权人又当如何应对？本文中，笔者将对这一原则进行解读和分析，并基于笔者的执业经验提出相应建议。

一、金融债委会确立“一致行动原则”的动机

根据银保监会等四部门联合发布的《关于印发金融机构债权人委员会工作规程的通知》（银保监发〔2020〕57号，以下简称《工作规程》），金融债委会系庭外金融债务重组过程中设立的协商性、自律性、临时性组织，其成员主要为金融机构。与破产阶段的债权人委员会的职权由《企业破产法》直接作出规定不同，金融债委会的组织架构、议事规则和工作流程，以及各成员机构权利义务、成员机构退出机制、解散程序等事项均约定于当事人自愿签署的债权人协议中。

设立金融债委会的目的是为金融机构债权人搭建集体协商、共同决策、一致行动的工作平台，避免在企业债务危机爆发后个别金融机构单独“出逃”引起“踩踏”，为企业债务危机的化解争取时间和空间。因此，金融债委会成员有动力明确并遵守“一致行动原则”。

Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in the case of CII Parent, Inc., cementing the advice routinely given by bankruptcy counsel to borrowers in default. We always counsel borrower clients in default of the risk associated with lenders taking unilateral actions pre-filing, stripping debtors of valuable options and assets. Thus, we normally recommend to always obtain a forbearance and undertake the preparations required to file a bankruptcy petition immediately upon forbearance termination, although whether or not to file depends on variety of factors that should be considered.

The Second Circuit recently held that a non-party to an assumed executory contract is not entitled to a cure payment (although it may be so entitled if is a third-party beneficiary of the contract). The result would have seemed obvious to bankruptcy practitioners. So, what in the world made the party pursuing payment take this to the Second Circuit? Well, surprisingly, as the Second Circuit decision shows, the answer is not found in the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code. And while it was argued prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, 598 U.S.

A mortgage loan repurchase facility (more casually referred to as a "repo") is a financing structure commonly utilized to finance mortgage loans. These facilities are utilized by both residential and commercial mortgage loan originators and aggregators to finance mortgage loans that they originate or acquire. The structure is favored by liquidity providers in the mortgage loan finance arena due to its preferential "safe harbor" treatment under the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), as further described below.

Lenders often attempt to limit what a borrower can do outside the ordinary course of business by negotiating contractual protections. Some of these provisions are designed to make the borrowers bankruptcy remote by, for example, requiring the borrower’s Board to include an independent director whose consent is required for a bankruptcy filing. Others, as was the case we discuss here, however, go further by including contractual rights that limit a borrower’s ability to file for bankruptcy without the lender’s consent.