近年来,由于经济形势下行叠加新冠疫情,众多企业陷入经营困难和债务危机,庭外债务重组因具有较高的灵活性、自主性,不受时间和程序上的限制,成为化解企业债务危机的重要方式,而敏感债权因其涉众性成为庭外债务重组程序中的棘手问题。敏感债权往往与非法集资有着千丝万缕的联系,本文将从庭外重组中涉非(涉嫌非法集资)敏感债权处置角度出发,具体分析敏感债权处置方案中的重点法律问题,以及律师在涉非敏感债权处置中的作用。
一、敏感债权的概念与特征
(一)敏感债权的概念
正如庭外重组一样,对于敏感债权,法律尚未给出明确的定义。结合过往庭外重组等债务风险处置案例,可以将敏感债权理解为:因涉及众多自然人债权人,可能涉嫌非法集资,而需要在债务处置中特别考虑的债权,主要包括涉及个人的理财产品和民间集资。
(二)敏感债权的特征
敏感债权的主要特点如下:
1. 债权人一般为自然人,且人数众多,具有涉众性特点。敏感债权一般涉及众多自然人债权人,这类群体抗风险能力一般较差,企业债务危机爆发后,如果无法及时清偿敏感债权,可能诱发群体性事件,影响社会稳定。
One difficulty encountered by creditors and trustees in bankruptcy is the use of one or more aliases by a bankrupt. Whether it is an innocent use of a nickname or an attempt to conceal one's identity, the use of an alias can often create problems for creditors seeking to pursue debts and for trustees seeking to recover assets held by a bankrupt.
How does it happen?
As concerns about illegal phoenix activity continue to mount, it is worth remembering that the Corporations Act gives liquidators and provisional liquidators a powerful remedy to search and seize property or books of the company if it appears to the Court that the conduct of the liquidation is being prevented or delayed.
When a person is declared a bankrupt, certain liberties are taken away from that person. One restriction includes a prohibition against travelling overseas unless the approval has been given by the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy. This issue was recently considered by the Federal Court in Moltoni v Macks as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Moltoni (No 2) [2020] FCA 792, which involved the Federal Court's review of the trustee's initial refusal of an application by a bankrupt, Mr Moltoni, to travel to and reside in the United Kingdom.
What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?
In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).
Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?
Getting to the top
The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.
Background
It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?
Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.