一、“集中管辖”概述

《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》（下称“《民事诉讼法》”）中，对于“集中管辖”并无明确的规定，而在民事诉讼的司法实践中，存在许多被称为“集中管辖”的做法。实务中，“集中管辖”泛指将某类案件，依照《民事诉讼法》及其他法律法规的相关规定，以司法解释或者通知的形式，集中由某类法院或某个法院管辖的情形。

概括来说，“集中管辖”共分为如下三种情形：

（1）某类法院集中管辖某类案件，如依据《中华人民共和国企业破产法》（下称“《企业破产法》”）第二十一条的规定，破产案件中涉债务人的诉讼案件集中由受理破产申请的人民法院管辖，或者依据《全国法院审理债券纠纷案件座谈会纪要》（以下简称“《债券会议纪要》”）第十条的规定，以发行人或者增信机构为被告提起的要求依约偿付债券本息或者履行增信义务的合同纠纷案件，由发行人住所地人民法院管辖；

（2）某个法院集中管辖某一类型化案件，如各地金融法院集中管辖当地金融案件、各地知识产权法院集中管辖当地知识产权案件；

One difficulty encountered by creditors and trustees in bankruptcy is the use of one or more aliases by a bankrupt. Whether it is an innocent use of a nickname or an attempt to conceal one's identity, the use of an alias can often create problems for creditors seeking to pursue debts and for trustees seeking to recover assets held by a bankrupt.

How does it happen?

As concerns about illegal phoenix activity continue to mount, it is worth remembering that the Corporations Act gives liquidators and provisional liquidators a powerful remedy to search and seize property or books of the company if it appears to the Court that the conduct of the liquidation is being prevented or delayed.

When a person is declared a bankrupt, certain liberties are taken away from that person. One restriction includes a prohibition against travelling overseas unless the approval has been given by the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy. This issue was recently considered by the Federal Court in Moltoni v Macks as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Moltoni (No 2) [2020] FCA 792, which involved the Federal Court's review of the trustee's initial refusal of an application by a bankrupt, Mr Moltoni, to travel to and reside in the United Kingdom.

What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?

In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).

Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?

Getting to the top

The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.

Background

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?

Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.