近几年，受技术红利、产品市场、资本市场政策等多方面因素的影响，一些具有中国元素的美国公司寻求在中国境内（“境内”）市场的融资，探寻落地境内进而实现境内IPO的路径，但是，基于中美法律、税务系统的差异，在论证重组路径的过程中经常会耗费大量时间和金钱成本，往往因创始人和股东的美籍身份在重组过程中面临巨大的美国税负而导致重组搁浅。本文结合我们的实操经验对美国公司重组落回境内涉及的相关要点问题进行分析。

一、架构拆除的必要性

根据我国《公司法》，上市公司是指股票在证券交易所上市交易的、在中国境内设立的股份有限公司。但是，对于境外主体在境内A股上市的突破体现在根据《关于开展创新企业境内发行股票或存托凭证试点若干意见的通知》规定红筹企业允许发行股票或存托凭证在境内上市，例如“H公司（证券代码：688***）”以红筹企业通过直接跨境发行股票的方式以及“J公司（证券代码：689***）”以红筹企业通过发行存托凭证（CDR）的方式在境内上市，但前述情形下对于拟上市公司“红筹企业”的行业、预计市值等方面要求较高，且“红筹企业”一般被认为是注册在境外，主要经营活动在境内的企业[1]。因此，对于主要业务运营在美国且融资平台注册在中国境外的主体目前仍难以在境内直接上市。

One difficulty encountered by creditors and trustees in bankruptcy is the use of one or more aliases by a bankrupt. Whether it is an innocent use of a nickname or an attempt to conceal one's identity, the use of an alias can often create problems for creditors seeking to pursue debts and for trustees seeking to recover assets held by a bankrupt.

How does it happen?

As concerns about illegal phoenix activity continue to mount, it is worth remembering that the Corporations Act gives liquidators and provisional liquidators a powerful remedy to search and seize property or books of the company if it appears to the Court that the conduct of the liquidation is being prevented or delayed.

When a person is declared a bankrupt, certain liberties are taken away from that person. One restriction includes a prohibition against travelling overseas unless the approval has been given by the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy. This issue was recently considered by the Federal Court in Moltoni v Macks as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Moltoni (No 2) [2020] FCA 792, which involved the Federal Court's review of the trustee's initial refusal of an application by a bankrupt, Mr Moltoni, to travel to and reside in the United Kingdom.

What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?

In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).

Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?

Getting to the top

The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.

Background

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?

Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.