In a recent decision, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) further outlined the requirements for the avoidance of a transaction under insolvency law on the grounds of wilful disadvantage to creditors pursuant to section 133 of the German Insolvency Code (InsO).

Background

Background

Under German insolvency law, employees are generally protected from claw-back claims. The payment of wages is considered a "cash transaction" if the employer pays the salary within three months of the work being performed. A “cash transaction” can only be contested in limited circumstances. Where a third party pays the salary, the cash transaction privilege remains if it is not clear to the employee that a third party made the payment (s.142(2) and s.3 InsO).

A recent German Federal Court of Justice ruling shows that this protection has limits.

The German court has published LG München I v. 13.07.2021 - 6 O 17571/20 – the first published ruling on COVInsAG. We unpack the key takeaways from the decision below.

Background

To mitigate the economic effects of the pandemic, the German government passed the COVID-19 Insolvency Suspension Act (COVInsAG) to temporarily suspend the obligation on directors to file for insolvency where the debtor's insolvency was due to the pandemic. The COVInsAG (Section 2(1) Nos.2 and 4) also suspends large parts of the rules on insolvency avoidance.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background

When an individual files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the debtor’s non-exempt assets become property of the estate that is used to pay creditors. “Property of the estate” is a defined term under the Bankruptcy Code, so a disputed question in many cases is: What assets are, in fact, available to creditors?

Once a Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge of personal debts, creditors are enjoined from taking action to collect, recover, or offset such debts. However, unlike personal debts, liens held by secured creditors “ride through” bankruptcy. The underlying debt secured by the lien may be extinguished, but as long as the lien is valid it survives the bankruptcy.

A Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan requires a debtor to satisfy unsecured debts by paying all “projected disposable income” to unsecured creditors over a five-year period. In a recent case before the U.S.

One of the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code is to ensure that each class of creditors is treated equally. And one of the ways that is accomplished is to allow the debtor’s estate to claw back certain pre-petition payments made to creditors. Accordingly, creditors of a debtor who files for bankruptcy are often unpleasantly surprised to learn that they may be forced to relinquish “preferential” payments they received before the bankruptcy filing.