There are few things as daunting to a vendor or supplier as its counterparty’s bankruptcy. The likelihood of a significantly discounted recovery for goods and services provided and potential loss of a customer may have long-lasted impacts on profitability. Even worse, however, is the prospect that payments received in good faith prior to a debtor’s bankruptcy filing may be at risk of recoupment. In this alert, we address the risk that such payments are voidable as preferential transfers.

Unitranche financing began as a middle-market product, tracing its origins to the days of recovery from the global credit crisis. The credit markets re-opened with an explosion of available capital from traditional lenders, business development companies and other direct lenders. With an increasing supply of capital, leverage shifted to borrowers and private equity, allowing them to better dictate the terms and conditions of their loan facilities. With the greater prevalence of so-called “covenant-lite” loans, also came the exponential growth of the unitranche market.

The merchant cash advance (“MCA”) industry recently provided two different bankruptcy courts with an opportunity to consider the characterization of MCA funding transactions as either “true sales” of receivables or “disguised loans”.

Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in all fifty states plus the District of Columbia with relatively few variations, sets out, among other things, the rules to be followed when obtaining a security interest in personal property collateral to secure a loan. The basic premise of Article 9 is that if the lender follows the rules, it should be protected against third parties, including other creditors or a bankruptcy trustee, who would seek to challenge the lender’s security interest or the priority of the security interest.

In its much-discussed decision, City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2020), the Supreme Court ruled that the City of Chicago (“City”) was not in violation of Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code for failing to release an impounded car to a debtor in bankruptcy.

Periodically courts remind corporate directors that their decisions to act or to refrain from acting during the course of managing the affairs of a corporation are not without limitations. It is well established that corporate directors owe fiduciary duties, and more specifically, a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to corporate shareholders. Those duties should always be at the front of mind of every director when any action or inaction is contemplated, but in particular, when addressing challenging issues facing the corporation.

One difficulty encountered by creditors and trustees in bankruptcy is the use of one or more aliases by a bankrupt. Whether it is an innocent use of a nickname or an attempt to conceal one's identity, the use of an alias can often create problems for creditors seeking to pursue debts and for trustees seeking to recover assets held by a bankrupt.

How does it happen?

As concerns about illegal phoenix activity continue to mount, it is worth remembering that the Corporations Act gives liquidators and provisional liquidators a powerful remedy to search and seize property or books of the company if it appears to the Court that the conduct of the liquidation is being prevented or delayed.

When a person is declared a bankrupt, certain liberties are taken away from that person. One restriction includes a prohibition against travelling overseas unless the approval has been given by the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy. This issue was recently considered by the Federal Court in Moltoni v Macks as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Moltoni (No 2) [2020] FCA 792, which involved the Federal Court's review of the trustee's initial refusal of an application by a bankrupt, Mr Moltoni, to travel to and reside in the United Kingdom.

What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?