In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

In the decision in Woodhouse, in the matter of Panoramic Resources Limited [2024] FCA 449, handed down this week (1 May 2024) by Feutrill J, the Federal Court of Australia considered the meaning of ‘Secured Property ‘as defined in a specific security deed and the extent to which phrases such as ‘…in respect of’ could expand the types of collateral the subject of that defined term (and hence the collateral the subject of the specific security d

Legal proceedings need to be filed before the end of any relevant limitation period, otherwise they will be time-barred — often irreparably. There are various reasons why a person may delay commencing proceedings – for example, they may be waiting on litigation funding before prosecuting their claim or need more time to gather evidence in order to decide whether to proceed.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

The decision in RPPS v Brookfield is the first recorded instance of s 151 of the PPSA being enforced (with a $30,000 penalty imposed for an improper registration). It serves as a caution to those making spurious registrations, but reasonably diligent and responsible parties should have no cause for alarm.

The decision in RPPS v Brookfield is the first recorded instance of s 151 of the PPSA being enforced (with a $30,000 penalty imposed for an improper registration). It serves as a caution to those making spurious registrations, but reasonably diligent and responsible parties should have no cause for alarm.

Overview of section 151 of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

We are excited to share the inaugural edition of R+I In Brief, where we explore the past year of developments in the Australian restructuring and insolvency industry and provide our thoughts on the year ahead.

The 2023 edition of R+I In Brief includes a collection of articles and case notes we have prepared as well as some further commentary on issues we consider pertinent to the restructuring and insolvency industry.

It is broken up into three parts:

In this Part of the 2023 edition of R+I In Brief, we delve into significant judicial developments relating to insolvency law, including: