And so, we continue the tale with the TIBs now triumphantly holding both the hard-won exequatur which expressly recognised the bankruptcy order and Trustee in Bankruptcy (TIB) and confirmed that all rights and powers were enforceable in France and judgment of the French criminal court which restored the seized criminal assets to the TIBs under the vesting provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986. However, there were still clear and untested differences to obtaining automatic recognition under the EU Regulation on Insolvency proceedings (as Recast) (RIR).
Despite numerous obstacles and challenges faced along the way following Brexit (and its inevitable impact on tracing and recovering assets of UK based debtors overseas), we last left our brave cross-border recovery specialists triumphantly holding the hard-won exequatur judgment which expressly recognised the bankruptcy order and Trustee in Bankruptcy (TIB) and confirmed that all rights and powers were enforceable in France. Vive La France!
In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.
We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.
We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).
Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.
Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.
An article for Insolvency Practitioners and other insolvency specialists outlining the challenges and pitfalls of obtaining recognition of a Trustee in Bankruptcy to enable enforcement over assets in France in a post-Brexit and post-Covid cross-border insolvency landscape.
Introduction
We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.
We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .