In Bechara v Bates,^[1] the Full Federal Court reminds us of the proper procedure for review of a sequestration order made by a registrar. This case raises an important point about bankruptcy practice and procedure in the Federal Circuit Court and the Federal Court.

In Ross, in the matter of Print Mail Logistics (International) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Elias,^[1] the Federal Court considered the extent to which a Jones v Dunkel^[2] inference can be made.

In March, we reported on a brief filed by the Solicitor General recommending denial of a petition for certiorari filed by Tribune creditors seeking Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit ruling dismissing their state-law fraudulent transfer claims.

A discharge of debt in bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). Certain debts, however, including debts “for violation of . . . any of the State securities laws,” are not subject to discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). A discharge injunction does not bar the collection of such debts.

On 1 January 2021, a number of changes to Australia’s insolvency framework came into effect, pursuant to the Corporations Amendment (Corporate Insolvency Reforms) Act 2020 (Cth) (the Act).

We have blogged previously about section 546(e), the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain transfers otherwise subject to avoidance as preferences or fraudulent transfers. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). Among the transfers protected by the section 546(e) safe harbor are transfers by or to a “financial participant” made “in connection with a securities contract.” Id.

The Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. These avoidance powers are subject to certain limitations, including a safe harbor in section 546(e) exempting certain transfers. Among other things, section 546(e) bars avoidance of a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . .

In Caron and Seidlitz v Jahani and McInerney in their capacity as liquidators of Courtenay House Pty Ltd (in liq) & Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2),[1] the New South Wales Court of Appeal was faced with what it described as the ‘classic insolvency conundrum’: how to distribute funds to investors as equally and as fairly as possible where the funds have

The recently announced proposed insolvency reforms draw on key features from Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States and aim to help more small businesses restructure and survive the economic impact of COVID-19.

The reforms will cover around 76% of businesses subject to insolvencies today, 98% of whom have less than 20 employees.[1]

Last February, we blogged about the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp, No. 19-1430, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4947 (Feb. 18, 2020). The Third Circuit approved a process for resolving asbestos claims in which a bar date was imposed on filing the claims, but late claimants who were unaware of their asbestos claims would be allowed to have the bar date excused through Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3). (A bar date is a date set by the court by which all claims against the debtor must be filed.