In our last blogpost (here) we reported how the court had, for the first time, exercised its power under s. 901C(4) Companies Act 2006 to exclude a company’s members and all but one class of its creditors from voting on a restructuring plan under Part 26A. The facts of this case are set out in more detail in that blogpost.
Summary
For the first time, the court has exercised its power under s. 901C(4) Companies Act 2006 to exclude a company’s members and all but one class of its creditors from voting on a restructuring plan under Part 26A. The court was satisfied that only one class of creditors had a genuine economic interest in the company and noted that “this was not a marginal case”.
Key drivers for the court’s decision (see more detail below) were:
There has been much debate in recent years around the use made of certain UK restructuring tools – the company voluntary arrangement and, more recently, the new restructuring plan – to restructure commercial property leases. Commercial tenants argue that compromise is necessary to address high fixed costs that are no longer sustainable, but landlords have often been critical of the approach taken. This debate has become more acute in the context of the pandemic, as many High Street businesses subject to mandatory closure have built up significant rent arrears that need to be addressed.
There has been much debate in recent years around the use made of certain UK restructuring tools – the company voluntary arrangement and, more recently, the new restructuring plan – to restructure commercial property leases. Commercial tenants argue that compromise is necessary to address high fixed costs that are no longer sustainable, but landlords have often been critical of the approach taken. This debate has become more acute in the context of the pandemic, as many High Street businesses subject to mandatory closure have built up significant rent arrears that need to be addressed.
Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").
One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.