On January 7, 2013, the Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a dispute concerning the debtors’ use of cash collateral was not subject to arbitration, notwithstanding a broad arbitration clause in the parties’ underlying agreement, because the decision to allow a debtor to use cash collateral constituted a “core” issue and was a fundamental aspect of the bankruptcy process. In re Hostess Brands, Inc., No. 12-22052 (RDD), 2013 WL 82914 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013).

Background

Introduction

If a company is insolvent, it is either not able to pay its debts as they fall due, or its assets are less than its liabilities.  An investor/creditor will have the ability to put the company into a formal insolvency procedure and, in most cases, appoint an independent third party to take control of the assets and investigate the conduct of the company’s directors, managers and other controlling functionaries.  Defined terms in this article are the same as the terms which were defined in the potential causes of action article.

On May 4, 2012 Judge Kevin J. Carey of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that a claim against a debtor’s estate, transferred to a third party, is subject to the same infirmities as in the hands of the original holder of the claim.  In re KB Toys, Inc., — B.R. —-, 2012 WL 1570755, at *11 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).  Judge Carey’s opinion diverged from, and criticized, the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., L.L.C., 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y.

On March 26, 2012, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware refused to rule that, as a matter of law, payments made to satisfy a debtor’s obligations under a letter of credit constitute “settlement payments” protected from avoidance under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. EPLG I, LLC v. Citibank, National Association et al. (In re Qimonda Richmond, LLC, et al.), No. 09-10589, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1264 (Bankr.

On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a discounted cash flow analysis constituted “a commercially reasonable determinant[] of value” for purposes of section 562(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 In so doing, the court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware decision sustaining the objection of American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc.

I. Introduction.

Despite the prevalence of first-lien/secondlien structures in the loan market over the course of the recently-ended leveraged transaction cycle, fully-litigated cases interpreting the provisions of first-lien/second-lien intercreditor agreements remain something of a rarity. As a result, cases providing guidance on the extent to which customary waivers included in such intercreditor agreements would be enforced are always welcomed by finance practitioners. It comes as no surprise then, that the decision of Judge Peck of the U.S.

(Judgment 3/2009)  

The liquidators of Flightlease (Guernsey) Limited (“FLGL”) applied to the Court for an order that no dividends be paid in the liquidation of FLGL to Flightlease (Ireland) Limited (“FLI”) in respect of guarantees given by  

FLGL in respect of FLI’s liabilities. FLI’s liabilities to FLGL were outweighed by the liabilities owed in the opposite direction.