On March 11, 2016, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued an opinion in the Energy Future Holdings bankruptcy that resolved an intercreditor dispute over $90 million in proceeds to be distributed under the plan of reorganization.
Although almost eight years have lapsed since the chapter 11 cases of Tulsa, Oklahoma-based SemCrude L.P.
On July 23, 2015, in an action arising from the huge TCEH chapter 11 bankruptcy, Judge Paul A. Engelmayer of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion in Delaware Trust Company v.
On April 1, 2013, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California ruled that the City of Stockton qualified to file for protection under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court’s decision on this issue serves as an important milestone for chapter 9 jurisprudence, clarifying the requirements for “good faith” negotiations and being “insolvent” as conditions to filing for chapter 9 protection. Significantly, the court held that a municipal debtor need not negotiate with all of its creditors, only those that it intends to impair.
On January 7, 2013, the Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a dispute concerning the debtors’ use of cash collateral was not subject to arbitration, notwithstanding a broad arbitration clause in the parties’ underlying agreement, because the decision to allow a debtor to use cash collateral constituted a “core” issue and was a fundamental aspect of the bankruptcy process. In re Hostess Brands, Inc., No. 12-22052 (RDD), 2013 WL 82914 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013).
Background
On May 4, 2012 Judge Kevin J. Carey of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that a claim against a debtor’s estate, transferred to a third party, is subject to the same infirmities as in the hands of the original holder of the claim. In re KB Toys, Inc., — B.R. —-, 2012 WL 1570755, at *11 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012). Judge Carey’s opinion diverged from, and criticized, the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., L.L.C., 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y.
On March 26, 2012, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware refused to rule that, as a matter of law, payments made to satisfy a debtor’s obligations under a letter of credit constitute “settlement payments” protected from avoidance under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. EPLG I, LLC v. Citibank, National Association et al. (In re Qimonda Richmond, LLC, et al.), No. 09-10589, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1264 (Bankr.
On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a discounted cash flow analysis constituted “a commercially reasonable determinant[] of value” for purposes of section 562(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 In so doing, the court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware decision sustaining the objection of American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc.
The year 2009 set a record for defaults and restructurings. Ownership of companies changed rapidly and, given the freeze up in capital markets, most of the new capital structures were significantly deleveraged, leaving little role for pre-existing sponsors and other equity holders of troubled companies. Halfway through 2010, even though actual bankruptcies have declined, restructuring continues through an amendment and forbearance process that is driven by the potential consequences to stakeholders in a court supervised restructuring.
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a new non-judicial receivership al-ternative for resolving troubled financial companies that could threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system (“Covered Financial Companies”), as described further below. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), on October 12, 2010, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (the “Proposal”) to begin to implement the provisions of Title II.