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Un emprunteur qui, sans en avoir le droit, ne paierait pas l'échéance d'un crédit entre le 12 mars 2020 et l'expiration d'un délai d'un mois à compter de la date de cessation de l'état d'urgence sanitaire (lui-même censé durer deux mois à compter du 24 mars 2020 sauf report), pourrait arguer que la clause d'exigibilité anticipée du crédit et la clause d'intérêts de retard (une clause pénale) ne pourront produire leurs effets qu'à compter de l'expiration de cette période en application de l'ordonnance n° 2020-306 du 25 mars 2020 prise en application de la loi d'urgence n° 2020-290 du 23 mars

A borrower who, without having the right to do so, would not pay a credit instalment due between 12 March 2020 and one month after the end of the state of health emergency (which is supposed to last two months as from 24 March 2020 but could be extended), could argue that the loan documents' acceleration clause and default interest clause (a liquidated damage clause) shall only take effect after that period pursuant to Ordinance No. 2020-306 of 25 March 2020, adopted further to the "emergency" Law No. 2020-290 of 23 March 2020.

A borrower who, without having the right to do so, would not pay a credit instalment due between 12 March 2020 and one month after the end of the state of health emergency (which is supposed to last two months as from 24 March 2020 but could be extended), could argue that the loan documents' acceleration clause and default interest clause (a liquidated damage clause) shall only take effect after that period pursuant to Ordinance No. 2020-306 of 25 March 2020, adopted further to the "emergency" Law No. 2020-290 of 23 March 2020.

Affirming the bankruptcy court below in a case of first impression, in In re Caviata Attached Homes, LLC, 481 B.R. 34 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012), a Ninth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel held that a relapse into economic recession following a chapter 11 debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy was not an “extraordinary circumstance” that would justify the filing of a new chapter 11 case for the purpose of modifying the debtor’s previously confirmed plan of reorganization.

Modification of a Confirmed Chapter 11 Plan

In the first circuit-level opinion on the issue, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Matson v. Alarcon, 651 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2011), held that, for purposes of establishing priority under section 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, an employee's severance pay was "earned" entirely upon termination of employment, even though the severance amount was determined by the employee's length of service with the employer.

Section 507(a)(4)

The Bankruptcy Code treats insiders with increased scrutiny, from longer preference periods to rigorous equitable subordination principles, denial of chapter 7 trustee voting rights, disqualification in some cases of votes on a cram-down chapter 11 plan, and restrictions on postpetition key-employee compensation packages. The treatment of claims by insiders for prebankruptcy services is no exception to this general policy: section 502(b)(4) disallows insider claims for services to the extent the claim exceeds the "reasonable value" of such services.