Bankruptcy remote structures have become common in recent years to attempt to prevent a borrower from filing for Chapter 11. One such structure is commonly referred to as a “golden share.” The “golden share” typically refers to a noneconomic membership interest provided to a lender whose vote would be necessary for the borrower to file Chapter 11.

The Fifth Circuit in InreFranchiseServs.ofN.Am.,Inc., 891 F.3d 198, 209

Videology, Inc., along with four of its affiliates and subsidiaries, has filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (Lead Case No. 18-11120). Videology, based in Baltimore, MA, is a software solutions provider in the TV and digital advertising industry.

Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debtor “subject to the court’s approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 365. This provision is a powerful tool because it allows a chapter 11 debtor to assume agreements that will be beneficial to restructuring efforts while rejecting agreements that are burdensome. Given its importance, the application of section 365 is not without challenge and subject to interpretation.

Affirming the bankruptcy court below in a case of first impression, in In re Caviata Attached Homes, LLC, 481 B.R. 34 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012), a Ninth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel held that a relapse into economic recession following a chapter 11 debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy was not an “extraordinary circumstance” that would justify the filing of a new chapter 11 case for the purpose of modifying the debtor’s previously confirmed plan of reorganization.

Modification of a Confirmed Chapter 11 Plan

In the first circuit-level opinion on the issue, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Matson v. Alarcon, 651 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2011), held that, for purposes of establishing priority under section 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, an employee's severance pay was "earned" entirely upon termination of employment, even though the severance amount was determined by the employee's length of service with the employer.

Section 507(a)(4)

The Bankruptcy Code treats insiders with increased scrutiny, from longer preference periods to rigorous equitable subordination principles, denial of chapter 7 trustee voting rights, disqualification in some cases of votes on a cram-down chapter 11 plan, and restrictions on postpetition key-employee compensation packages. The treatment of claims by insiders for prebankruptcy services is no exception to this general policy: section 502(b)(4) disallows insider claims for services to the extent the claim exceeds the "reasonable value" of such services.