Liability management transactions which may favour a subset of creditors over another are increasingly common in the US leveraged finance markets. 2024 may be seen as the year in which these US imports began to make a real impact in Europe. Which strategies could creditors employ to protect themselves from unfavourable treatment where such transactions are attempted?
In the current market, investors are increasingly considering their options in relation to the stressed and distressed credits in their portfolios. Whilst mindful of stakeholder relationships, secured lenders may, in some circumstances, wish to consider the "nuclear option": enforcing their share pledge over a holding company of the operating group (ideally, such pledge being over a single company which directly or indirectly holds the entire business - a "single point of enforcement").
Senior secured creditors, being the anchor creditor in the capital stack, will always be focused on ensuring their priority claim is as robust as possible, with clearly delineated capacity for 'super priority' debt. However, today's documentary flexibilities, coupled with local legal restrictions, can mean senior secured creditors are not as 'senior secured' as they think. Here are some points to think about.
Super Senior Debt
What is the so-called "creditor duty"?
This is the duty, introduced into English common law by the leading case of West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd1 in 1988, of company directors to consider, or act in accordance with, the interests of the company's creditors when the company becomes insolvent, or when it approaches, or is at real risk of insolvency.
Background
On 22 July 2022, the English High Court sanctioned Houst Limited’s (“Houst” or the “Company”) restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”), which significantly, is the first time a Restructuring Plan has been used to cram down HM Revenue & Customs (“HMRC”) as preferential creditor.1
Background
On 12 January 2022, the English High Court granted Smile Telecoms Holdings Limited’s (“Smile” or the “Company”) application to convene a single meeting of plan creditors (the super senior creditors) to vote on the Company’s proposed restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”). It is the first plan to use section 901C(4) of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) to exclude other classes of creditors and shareholders from voting on the Restructuring Plan on the basis that they have no genuine economic interest in the Company.
Background
On the 19th of August 2021, the English High Court sanctioned a Part 26A restructuring plan proposed by the administrators of Amicus Finance plc (in administration) (“Amicus”) for the company’s solvent exit from administration, enabling the company to be rescued as a going concern (the “Restructuring Plan”).
On 29 September 2021, the English High Court rejected a challenge in respect of Caff Nero's company voluntary arrangement ("CVA"), brought by a landlord on the grounds of material irregularity and unfair prejudice. The single disgruntled landlord, with the backing of the EG Group ("EG") (who were interested in acquiring Caff Nero), argued that the directors of the company and the CVA nominees breached their respective duties in refusing to adjourn or postpone the electronic voting process to vote on the CVA, after EG had submitted an eleventh-hour offer for Caff Nero.
Key Takeaways