When a financing statement is registered to perfect a security interest in collateral, it is the responsibility of the secured party to monitor the registration to ensure that a new financing statement is filed if the goods move jurisdictions. A recent decision by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice1 emphasizes this point.

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A discharge is effective whether or not the secured party intended to discharge that particular registration.  That was the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,1 which left JP Morgan unsecured for $1.5 billion as a result of a paperwork mix-up. Case law in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada suggests that the decision here would be the same.  Conseq

In recent years, manufacturers and lessors of heavy industrial equipment have installed sophisticated systems into their units which require a computer code be entered in order for the equipment to operate. This computer code may need to be updated or changed periodically. If the purchaser or lessee is in arrears in making payment to the manufacturer or lessor, the manufacturer or lessor may refuse to supply the debtor with the new access code. In effect, the manufacturer or lessor has the ability to remotely render the equipment unusable.

Before soliciting votes on its bankruptcy plan, a chapter 11 debtor that has filed for bankruptcy typically must obtain court approval of its disclosure statement. As part of the disclosure-statement approval process, interested parties are afforded the opportunity to object. For example, a party may object on the grounds that the disclosure statement lacks sufficient information about the debtor. Sometimes, however, a party objects to the disclosure statement because the chapter 11 plan described by the statement cannot be confirmed.

The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.

In Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall, a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith, lost by a 5-4 margin Round 2 of its Supreme Court bout with the estate of E. Pierce Marshall in a contest over Vickie's rights to a portion of the fortune of her late husband, billionaire J. Howard Marshall II. The dollar figures in dispute, amounting to more than $400 million, and the celebrity status of the original (and now deceased) litigants may grab headlines.

Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.

Rehabilitating a debtor’s business and maximizing the value of its estate for the benefit of its various stakeholders through the confirmation of a chapter 11 plan is the ultimate goal in most chapter 11 cases. Achievement of that goal, however, typically requires resolution of disagreements among various parties in interest regarding the composition of the chapter 11 plan and the form and manner of the distributions to be provided thereunder.

A recent decision of the Alberta Queen’s Bench1 has raised some questions about purchase-money security interest (“PMSI”) proceeds and cross-collateralization of assets secured by these types of security interests. It has been suggested that this decision is unique and establishes that using a PMSI as collateral for other indebtedness of the debtor is dangerous. But is this decision really so radical?

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