InGrayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Securities, LLC (In re Derivium Capital LLC), 716 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2013), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined whether certain securities transferred and payments made during the course of a Ponzi scheme could be avoided as fraudulent transfers under sections 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court upheld a judgment denying avoidance of pre-bankruptcy transfers of securities because the debtor did not have an “interest” in the securities at the time of the transfers.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) for the Eighth Circuit held on March 25, 2013, that a lender “lost its possessory lien when it turned the Debtor’s account funds over to the Trustee without first seeking adequate protection.” In re WEB2B Payment Solutions, Inc., _____ B.R. 2013 _____, 2013WL 1188041, *5 (8^th Cir. B.A.P. March 25, 2013) (emphasis added).

On January 10, 2012, a Florida bankruptcy court ruled in In re Pearlman, 462 B.R. 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012), that substantive consolidation is purely a bankruptcy remedy and that it accordingly did not have the power to consolidate the estate of a debtor in bankruptcy with the assets and affairs of a nondebtor. In so ruling, the court staked out a position on a contentious issue that has created a widening rift among bankruptcy and appellate courts regarding the scope of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over nondebtor entities.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently considered the enforceability of claims for "make-whole" amounts and damages for breach of a "no-call" provision. In re Chemtura Corp., No. 09-11233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2010) ("Chemtura"). These provisions are generally enforceable outside of bankruptcy, but enforceability in the context of a bankruptcy case is still unclear. In Chemtura, the court did not actually rule on enforceability but approved a settlement that allocated value to creditors on account of a make-whole clause and a no-call provision.

A New York bankruptcy judge held on October 4, 2010, that second lien lenders could object to a debtor’s bid procedures approved by the first lien lenders despite the terms of an intercreditor agreement inIn re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10-14419 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010).1 The intercreditor agreement provided the first lien lenders with the “exclusive right to…make determinations regarding the…sale” of the collateral. According to the court, however, the agreement did not expressly preclude the second lien lenders from objecting to bid procedures.