Winding up petition struck out as an abuse of process where the court was not satisfied that the petitioner was a creditor.

Can a company file a notice of intention to appoint an administrator (NOI) if administration is just one of a number of potential options being explored for rescuing the company?

Are funds subject to an IVA if they are received by a debtor after a certificate of completion has been issued by the supervisor?

Should an administrator’s appointment be terminated where the motives of the appointor are improper but the statutory purpose of the administration can still be properly achieved?

On 22 April 2015 the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in the case of Jetivia SA and another v Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) and others [2015] UKSC 23, which was heard in October last year.  In short it decided that: 1) defendant directors cannot raise illegality as a defence to a claim by a company where the directors themselves acted wrongfully; and 2) a claim in fraudulent trading under Section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (Section 213)has extra-territorial effect.

Background

Removal of requirement for sanction

Previously under section 165 IA 86, liquidators in a voluntary winding up would have to seek sanction of the company (in members’ voluntary liquidation) or of the court or liquidation committee (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) in order to exercise their powers to pay debts, compromise claims etc. SBEEA removes this requirement so that liquidators can exercise those powers freely. This will aid expeditious winding up of companies. Equivalent provisions have also been put into place for trustees in bankruptcy.

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).

A look at the recent restructuring of the Co-operative Bank and EU proposals for mandatory reform

The Co-operative Bank announced in mid-June that it would need to carry out a forced listing of £300m new shares on the London Stock Exchange to fill a capital hole of around £1.5bn. Co-op's difficulties are said to have been triggered by mounting losses at Britannia Building Society - which Co-Op acquired in 2009 - that were highlighted when the bank failed to follow through on its planned acquisition of 632 Lloyds branches in February this year.

On Dec. 21, 2011, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey approved a liquidation plan for collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) Zais Investment Grade Limited VII (“ZING VII”). The plan incorporates a settlement between senior noteholders who had initiated the bankruptcy case by filing an involuntary petition against the CDO, and junior noteholders who were appealing the Bankruptcy Court’s April 26, 2011 order granting the involuntary petition.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently held that a Cayman Islands collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) could be a debtor under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and declined to dismiss an involuntary case commenced against the CDO by certain noteholders on the grounds that the notes held by such noteholders were “non-recourse” notes. Below is a discussion of the court’s decision and its potential implications. The decision is currently being appealed.