企业出现债务危机后，可能最终不得不走向破产清算的结局。通常而言，处于债务危机中的企业已存在无偿债能力（insolvent）的情况，不能藉由公司自行注销的程序完成注销公司；否则，未经清盘程序注销的公司有可能仍被债权人申请恢复，并继续追索债务，届时会给公司股东或董事带来不必要的麻烦。相应地，虽然清盘后解散的公司在法律上仍有可能被恢复，但仅限于清盘过程中遗漏重大债权或资产的情况等，通常不会出现这种情况。

根据《公司（清盘及杂项条文）条例》（香港条例第32章）第169条，香港公司清盘方式可分为两大类：第一类是由法院强制清盘；第二类是自愿清盘，而自愿清盘又可以分为股东自愿清盘与债权人自愿清盘两种。各路径均能令香港公司清盘，并在彻底厘清与处理资产及债务情况下宣告公司解散。本文为上篇，将简要介绍香港公司清盘的程序。

一、股东自愿清盘

股东自愿清盘是指公司可以自行由股东会进行特别决议，或董事会层面作出决议，宣布公司进行清盘，并委任清盘人进行清盘程序。根据《公司（清盘及杂项条文）条例》（香港条例第32章）第228条、229条和233条的要求，董事需要在清盘决议前的5个星期内发出一份《有偿债能力证明书》，说明董事已经详细地调查过公司事务，并认为在未来12个月内能够还清各项债务。

在各类跨境投资的项目中，投资人最担心的问题莫过于被投企业的财务状况出现困境，影响其持续经营能力和偿债能力并最终演变为债务危机，或者集团的持股结构、治理结构不够透明，各种交叉持股盘根错节。在重组过程中，投资者可能会帮助公司梳理、调整各种投资主体架构，而企业为了解除投资者顾虑，有时也会主动进行投资主体架构的重组和优化，包括把多余的主体和结构层级精简掉。

在跨境投资的架构中，往往涉及到多层持股架构，开曼公司、BVI公司以及香港公司都是常见的持股主体。如果我们在重组中需要把这些主体精简注销，需要走什么样的程序，复杂不复杂？在本文中，我们将与大家分享开曼豁免有限公司的清盘和解散，并且后续文章中陆续与大家分享其他法域主体的清算和注销。

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).