引言

自2022年5月起，上市公司“携带”未到期可转债进入预重整或重整程序的案例逐步在A股视野中涌现。截至目前，重整计划成功执行并顺利处置可转债违约风险的只有*ST正邦（002157）和*ST全筑（603030）两个案例。作为一种上市公司破产重整领域的新兴产品，由于可转债具有债权性、股权性和二级市场可交易等特点，较重整中的其他普通债权更具特殊性，给上市公司破产重整提出了“新课题”，应当在重整中进行定制化处理。

可转债在上市公司破产重整中的处理方式保持了其作为金融工具“进可攻，退可守”的特点，债券持有人可以选择到期兑付、转卖或转股。因此，重整方案设计中最为核心的是保护可转债原持有人在可转债产品项下的合法权利。通常做法为保留可转债持有人一定期限的交易及转股权利，利用可转债的特殊规则为持有人做好权利保护衔接，实现上市公司与持有人的利益共赢。

本文谨从可转债的特殊性及权利保护措施、实践中主要案例总结及重整方案设计要点等三个方面展开，对存续可转债在上市公司破产重整中的处理方式进行总结和探讨。

一、可转债的特殊性及权利保护

（一）可转债的特殊性

引言

2020年10月5日国务院发布的《关于进一步提高上市公司质量的意见》（国发〔2020〕14号）中明确规定，“上市公司实施破产重整的，应当提出解决资金占用、违规担保问题的切实可行方案”。2022年3月，沪深交易所分别发布《上海证券交易所上市公司自律监管指引第13号——破产重整等事项》《深圳证券交易所上市公司自律监管指引第14号——破产重整等事项》，进一步明确了上市公司在申请破产重整时，需要提交包含资金占用情况和违规担保情况的自查报告。至此，上市公司破产重整中两大“红线问题”暨资金占用及违规担保问题，已被提到了空前的高度。在重整前或重整中解决资金占用及违规担保问题已成为法院受理上市公司破产重整的必要条件。

资金占用系指非经营性资金占用，即上市公司控股股东及其关联方非经营性占用上市公司资金，以及变相利用经营性资金往来的形式达到实质非经营性占用上市公司资金的行为。违规担保，系指上市公司及其控股子公司违反法律法规规定或公司章程规定,或超过规定限额对外提供担保的行为。对于陷入危机的上市公司而言，违规担保往往表现为上市公司为控股股东及其关联方提供担保，也是控股股东变相占用上市公司资金的一种形式。因此，资金占用及违规担保问题在上市公司破产重整中往往相伴相生，需要一并解决。

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).