近年来，预重整已成为上市公司进入司法重整前几乎不可或缺的前置环节，其源于本土需求、服务于纾困实践的兴起路径，彰显了市场对高效挽救机制的迫切期待。然而，在立法规则尚属空白、实践探索快速扩张的背景下，该制度正面临深刻的异化趋势：预重整作为解决重整效率瓶颈与确定性风险而诞生的“辅助工具”，当其价值被证明有效后，迅速从“可选项”变成“默认项”，几乎成为上市公司重整的必经之路，其功能从“预先协商桥梁”偏移为“实质工作前置”，进而引致临时管理人角色模糊、权责失衡、企业拯救成本攀升等一系列结构性困境。基于对这一市场趋势的密切关注与忧思，本文聚焦于制度逻辑的完整性、各方权责利的平衡性以及程序正义的可实现性，将依次追溯制度的生成逻辑，呈现规则图谱的留白现状，解剖功能偏移衍生的核心痛点，并最终尝试提出使预重整回归其商业谈判本质、约束于重整前协商程序的路径展望。笔者深信，唯有正视当前实践中的张力与悖论，方能推动这一重要企业风险纾困工具的行稳致远，真正实现其提升困境企业重生效率与公平的初心。

一、制度起源：中国本土语境下的生成逻辑与“生存突围”

前言

2024年8月26日，苏州市检察院发布了《破产检察监督案件审查指引》（以下简称“《指引》”）。《指引》共计四章六十八条，全面涵盖破产检察监督的基本原则、监督范围、审查要素、监督方式和工作保障等内容。一定程度上，这是全国首例由检察机关根据破产程序的不同环节，详细完善地单独出台破产检察监督相关规定。9月30日，江苏省检察院召开破产领域检察监督工作新闻发布会，通报了全省检察机关开展破产领域检察监督工作的整体情况。

在《指引》出台前，检察机关对破产程序进行检察监督的法律规定较为原则化，缺乏实操层面的系统性规范。近年随着破产重整等案件数量的大幅增加，破产法律制度因缺乏直接、高效的违法行为监督与纠偏机制，导致债权人等破产参与主体的救济机制略显单一，在经济发展和立法实践中呈现出局限性。在各界呼吁拓展外部监督机制的背景下，各地检察机关不断深化提升破产检察监督职能。在本次《指引》发布前，江苏省检察院在2020年即已出台《加强破产案件检察监督工作的指导意见（试行）》，尝试更为规范地对破产程序进行检察监督。通过4年时间的摸索、总结与完善，江苏省检察机关共办理涉破产监督案件1,351件，为本次《指引》的出台奠定了理论与实践基础。

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).