The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

The safe harbor protection of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) §546(e) does not protect “transfers that are simply conducted through financial institutions,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on July 28, 2016. FTI Consulting Inc. v. Merit Management Group LP, 2016 WL 4036408, *1 (7th Cir. July 28, 2016).

Here the court refused to grant an injunction restraining contractor Space from presenting a winding up petition against the employer COD.  The employer had failed to pay 3 applications for payment (nos.

In another case involving a winding-up petition, the petition was dismissed, after the court found there was a dispute as to whether the statutory payment scheme applied to the contract.  The contractual arrangements between the parties were not formally documented, but there was a basic agreement as to the scope and price of the works, which arose out of a subcontract between Ro-Bal and main contractor McAlpines to provide fabrication and erection of steelworks at two sites.  At one site the works were completed and paid for, but at the other there was a dispute regarding payment

Here the Court of Appeal granted an injunction which restrained a building contractor (Harbour View) from presenting a winding-up petition, overturning the high court's decision at first instance.  Harbour View had been engaged under two separate contracts based on a JCT Intermediate WCD (2011) to carry out works at two separate sites.  The employer (Wilson) failed to pay against two interim certificates (August 2013 and September 2013), leaving a sum of over GBP 1.6 million owing.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on May 4, 2015, affirmed U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain’s decision confirming the reorganization plan for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. and its affiliated debtors.1 The Bankruptcy Court’s decision was controversial because it forced the debtors’ senior secured creditors to accept new secured notes bearing interest at below- market rates.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

The American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 issued today a 400-page report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”). The Report is the result of a two-year effort by 150 practitioner-ABI members.[1] Without considering the likelihood of Congressional passage in the near term, we will evaluate each significant proposed change separately in subsequent Alerts over the next several weeks.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 16, 2014, held that a “good faith transferee” in a fraudulent transfer suit “is entitled” to keep what it received “only to the extent” it gave “value.” Williams v. FDIC (In re Positive Health Management), 2014 WL 5293705, at *8 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2014). Reversing in part the district and bankruptcy courts, the Fifth Circuit narrowed their holding that the debtor had “received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the debtor’s cash transfers.” Id. at *1-2.