The Corporations Act 2001 sets out a regime for the order in which certain debts and claims are to be paid in priority to unsecured creditors.
That's straightforward enough for a liquidator, right?
Unfortunately, matters are not that straightforward. In effect, there are two priority regimes under the Act for the preferential payments of particular creditors, each of which applies to a different "fund", and we've observed this has led to some liquidators being unsure of how to proceed – or even worse, using funds they should not.
Our private credit clients are preparing for the next restructuring cycle and have called us about ultrafast bankruptcy cases. These chapter 11 cases have grabbed headlines because they lasted less than a day. Specifically, FullBeauty Brands and Sungard Availability Services emerged from bankruptcy in 24 hours and 19 hours, respectively. Is this a trend and which companies are best suited to zip through chapter 11?
A. Prepacks, Pre-Negotiated Cases, and Free-Falls
The equitable doctrine of marshalling can protect the security interests of subordinate secured creditors when a debtor becomes insolvent.
Marshalling is a neglected tool in the insolvency toolbox, but it can play an important role in protecting the security interests of subordinate secured creditors.
While the High Court has provided some clarity on the operation of the statutory priority regime, insolvency practitioners will still need to tread carefully when dealing with corporate trustees.
For insolvency practitioners who need clarity on how receivers and/or liquidators should pay, out of trust assets, priority employee claims arising from trust liabilities, the High Court's decision in Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia & Ors [2019] HCA 20 (Amerind) is a welcome result.
The securities safe harbor protection of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 546(e) does not protect allegedly fraudulent “transfers in which financial institutions served as mere conduits,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on Feb. 27, 2018. Merit Management Group LP v. FTI Consulting Inc., 2018 WL 1054879, *7 (2018). Affirming the Seventh Circuit’s reinstatement of the bankruptcy trustee’s complaint alleging the insolvent debtor’s overpayment for a stock interest, the Court found the payment not covered by §546(e) and thus recoverable. The district court had dismissed the trustee’s claim.
The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.
The safe harbor protection of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) §546(e) does not protect “transfers that are simply conducted through financial institutions,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on July 28, 2016. FTI Consulting Inc. v. Merit Management Group LP, 2016 WL 4036408, *1 (7th Cir. July 28, 2016).
Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on May 4, 2015, affirmed U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain’s decision confirming the reorganization plan for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. and its affiliated debtors.1 The Bankruptcy Court’s decision was controversial because it forced the debtors’ senior secured creditors to accept new secured notes bearing interest at below- market rates.
Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.