In a 5-3 decision handed down on May 15, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) is not violated when a debt collector files a proof of claim for a debt subject to the bar of an expired limitations period. The decision:
The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument Tuesday in Midland Funding v. Johnson. A primary issue before the Court is whether the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is violated by the filing in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case of a proof of claim representing a debt subject to an expired limitations period. The case originated from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which along with its earlier decision in Crawford v. LVNV, held the FDCPA is violated in those instances. Every other Circuit Court of Appeals has since found otherwise.
The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.
The safe harbor protection of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) §546(e) does not protect “transfers that are simply conducted through financial institutions,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on July 28, 2016. FTI Consulting Inc. v. Merit Management Group LP, 2016 WL 4036408, *1 (7th Cir. July 28, 2016).
Filing a proof of claim with a bankruptcy court representing a debt subject to an expired state law limitations period does not violate the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) under an opinion released yesterday from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under the ruling, in Owens v. LVNV, the Seventh Circuit joins the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s holding under Crawford v. LVNV that such proofs of claim violate the FDCPA.
Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on May 4, 2015, affirmed U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain’s decision confirming the reorganization plan for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. and its affiliated debtors.1 The Bankruptcy Court’s decision was controversial because it forced the debtors’ senior secured creditors to accept new secured notes bearing interest at below- market rates.
Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.
The American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 issued today a 400-page report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”). The Report is the result of a two-year effort by 150 practitioner-ABI members.[1] Without considering the likelihood of Congressional passage in the near term, we will evaluate each significant proposed change separately in subsequent Alerts over the next several weeks.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 16, 2014, held that a “good faith transferee” in a fraudulent transfer suit “is entitled” to keep what it received “only to the extent” it gave “value.” Williams v. FDIC (In re Positive Health Management), 2014 WL 5293705, at *8 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2014). Reversing in part the district and bankruptcy courts, the Fifth Circuit narrowed their holding that the debtor had “received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the debtor’s cash transfers.” Id. at *1-2.