The appointment of an independent director is a powerful tool for private credit lenders. The appointment is designed to introduce a voice of neutrality and fairness into the board’s decision-making process with the hope and expectation that independence from the controlling shareholder enables the board to drive toward viable value-maximizing strategies. Often times, the independent director is vested with exclusive authority (or veto rights) over a range of significant corporate decisions, including a sale, restructuring and the decision to file a bankruptcy case.
One common denominator links nearly all stressed businesses: tight liquidity. After the liquidity hole is identified and sized, the discussion inevitably turns to the question of who will fund the necessary capital to extend the liquidity runway. For a PE-backed business where there is a credible path to recovery, a sponsor, due to its existing equity stake, is often willing to inject additional capital into an underperforming portfolio company.
In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that unsecured noteholders’ claims against a debtor for certain “Applicable Premiums” were the “economic equivalent” to unmatured interest and, therefore, not recoverable under section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Die §§ 89 – 91 StaRUG: Eigenständiger Regelungsinhalt oder lediglich klarstellender Charakter? Wir klären auf!
Die EU-Richtlinie über Restrukturierung und Insolvenz (Restrukturierungsrichtlinie) enthält in Kapitel 4 (Art. 17, 18) besondere Vorschriften zur Insolvenzanfechtung. Diese hat der deutsche Gesetzgeber mit den §§ 89 – 91 StaRUG in nationales Recht umgesetzt. Daher lohnt sich ein vertiefter Blick auf diese Vorschriften.
Richtliniengeber möchte Finanzierungen und Zwischenfinanzierungen schützen
Insbesondere in Restrukturierungsfällen kann es erforderlich sein, einzelne Konzerngesellschaften abzuwickeln. Hierbei sind einige Besonderheiten zu beachten.
Das StaRUG hat das deutsche Sanierungsrecht ergänzt. Der neu eingeführte Restrukturierungsbeauftragte kann dabei als Moderator der Sanierung fungieren.
Ein Verständnis für die Rolle des Restrukturierungsbeauftragten* erfordert einen Blick auf den Ursprung und das Ziel des StaRUG. Es wurde geschaffen, um Unternehmen präventive Instrumente zur Verfügung zu stellen, die frühzeitigere Restrukturierungen außerhalb eines Insolvenzverfahrens ermöglichen.
Das StaRUG und der Restrukturierungsbeauftragte
As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.
There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.
Insolvency creditors in Germany do not have much to fear from a harmonisation of avoidance actions in the EU. They are used to rigid statutory provisions.
Bankruptcy Considerations for Unitranche Transactions with Super-Priority Revolvers without an AAL