Het is pandhouders op grond van artikel 3:246 lid 1 Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) toegestaan om een pandrecht op vorderingen uit te winnen door middel van het opeisen van de vordering. Deze bevoegdheid omvat tevens het recht om zekerheidsrechten uit te winnen die aan de verpande vordering zijn verbonden. Dit is bevestigd in een arrest van de Hoge Raad van 18 december 2015 (ABN AMRO / Marell).

Feiten

Pursuant to Article 3:246 paragraph 1 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC) pledgees have the power to enforce their right of pledge on receivables by claiming (direct) payment of the receivable. This power also includes the right to enforce rights of pledge that in their turn have been granted as security for the repayment of the pledged receivable. The Supreme Court confirmed this in its judgement of 18 December 2015 (ABN AMRO / Marell).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

The safe harbor protection of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) §546(e) does not protect “transfers that are simply conducted through financial institutions,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on July 28, 2016. FTI Consulting Inc. v. Merit Management Group LP, 2016 WL 4036408, *1 (7th Cir. July 28, 2016).

Het hof Amsterdam heeft in het voorjaar van 2016 een uitspraak gedaan over het ontstaansmoment van vorderingen van zorgaanbieders op patiënten en/of zorgverzekeraars. Het ontstaansmoment van een vordering is relevant om in geval van een faillissement van de pandgever te kunnen bepalen of een vordering (reeds) bestond – en dus geldig kan zijn verpand – of dat een vordering nog niet bestond – en dus niet geldig kan zijn verpand.

Feitencomplex

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on May 4, 2015, affirmed U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain’s decision confirming the reorganization plan for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. and its affiliated debtors.1 The Bankruptcy Court’s decision was controversial because it forced the debtors’ senior secured creditors to accept new secured notes bearing interest at below- market rates.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

The American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 issued today a 400-page report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”). The Report is the result of a two-year effort by 150 practitioner-ABI members.[1] Without considering the likelihood of Congressional passage in the near term, we will evaluate each significant proposed change separately in subsequent Alerts over the next several weeks.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 16, 2014, held that a “good faith transferee” in a fraudulent transfer suit “is entitled” to keep what it received “only to the extent” it gave “value.” Williams v. FDIC (In re Positive Health Management), 2014 WL 5293705, at *8 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2014). Reversing in part the district and bankruptcy courts, the Fifth Circuit narrowed their holding that the debtor had “received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the debtor’s cash transfers.” Id. at *1-2.