On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.

Introduction

On June 23, 2011, after fifteen years of hugely acrimonious litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States (the “Court”) issued a decision on a narrow legal issue that may end up significantly limiting the scope of bankruptcy courts’ core jurisdiction.  

Section 108 of the Bankruptcy Code grants a two-year extension of time for a trustee in bankruptcy (or a debtor in possession) to bring law suits, provided that the applicable period to sue didn’t expire before the petition date. It also gives a short extension to the trustee for filing pleadings, curing defaults, and performing other acts on behalf of the debtor. These provisions afford a trustee and debtor in possession valuable time to discover and evaluate potential causes of action and to perform other acts to preserve the debtor’s rights.

A New York bankruptcy judge held on October 4, 2010, that second lien lenders could object to a debtor’s bid procedures approved by the first lien lenders despite the terms of an intercreditor agreement inIn re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10-14419 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010).1 The intercreditor agreement provided the first lien lenders with the “exclusive right to…make determinations regarding the…sale” of the collateral. According to the court, however, the agreement did not expressly preclude the second lien lenders from objecting to bid procedures.

In a recent decision, SEC v Byers,1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that district courts possess the authority and discretion to bar the filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions without the district court’s permission.

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a foreign representative of a foreign insolvency proceeding to seek a bankruptcy court’s assistance in an ancillary proceeding upon recognition of the foreign proceeding. Upon recognition, Chapter 15 empowers a bankruptcy court to grant broad relief to a foreign representative to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of its creditors in the United States.

Credit bidding of debt held by a secured creditor at a sale of collateral under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code has become commonplace.1 Does a secured creditor have that same ability in a sale under a chapter 11 plan? Most thought so, but according to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, not always.

Break-up fees1 remain difficult for initial (or so-called “stalking horse”) bidders to obtain in the Third Circuit. In Kelson Channelview LLC v. Reliant Energy Channelview LP (In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP), No. 09-2074 (3d Cir. Jan.

Two decisions (one only weeks ago) have held that the scope of Bankruptcy Rule 2019 encompasses “informal committees” of bondholders and that such committees must comply with the extensive disclosure requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 2019.1 In a recent decision, Bankruptcy Judge Christopher Sontchi of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court came out the other way, ruling that such a committee was not a “committee representing more than one creditor” and, consequently, is not subject to Rule 2019.2 In so doing, Judge Sontchi considered but declined to follow the two decisions addressing the same issue:

Elaborating on its Resorts decision of ten years ago concerning payments to shareholders in a public leveraged buyout,1 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently ruled in In re Plassein Int’l, Corp.2 that the “settlement payment” exemption of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code also insulates selling shareholders in a private LBO from fraudulent transfer liability.