Fulltext Search

Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").

One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.

Yesterday, the Special Inspector General for the Trouble Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) released a report criticizing the Treasury Department’s role in the accelerated closure of hundreds of GM and Chrysler dealerships.

On Tuesday, the Bank of Spain released details regarding the status of the restructuring of the Spanish savings bank sector, in what it called “the biggest overhaul of the Spanish banking sector in recent history.” The Bank also provided details regarding funding for bank restructurings supplied by the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB),

Yesterday, the U.K. Treasury announced that it had published a report setting out detailed proposals for the effective management and resolution of failed investment banks.

Today, the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law held a hearing to discuss the role of bankruptcy and antitrust law in financial regulatory reform, particularly with respect to institutions that may be regarded as “too big to fail,” as highlighted during the financial crisis.

Testifying before the Subcommittee were the following witnesses:

Panel I