The Hong Kong Court of Appeal has finally laid to rest the vexed issue of whether an arbitration agreement or a winding-up petition should take precedence in an insolvency situation. In two parallel decisions, the Court of Appeal ruled that an arbitration agreement should be treated in the same way as an exclusive jurisdiction clause and that the principle should be given a wide interpretation.

The Singapore High Court has again confirmed that a winding-up application concerning a disputed debt that is subject to an arbitration agreement will be dismissed if the arbitration agreement is prima facie valid and covers the dispute. This prima facie standard of review was first formulated three years ago by the Singapore Court of Appeal in AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Company) [2020] SCGA 33.

Three recent Hong Kong first instance court decisions have left undecided the question of whether a winding-up petition will trump an agreement to arbitrate when it comes to a winding-up and particularly in the context of cross-claims. A Court of Final Appeal decision this spring had seemed to provide pointers that the parties' agreement would be upheld but the issue – particularly when it comes to unmeritorious and late arbitration applications – is dividing the courts.

A Hong Kong court has stayed a petition presented on the just and equitable ground to arbitration, on the basis of arbitration agreements found within what the petitioner described as quasi-partnership agreements formed in 2007. The court also dismissed claims that the appointed arbitrator lacked the requisite qualifications and experience, and that a stay would lead to further costs and duplication of resources.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background

When an individual files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the debtor’s non-exempt assets become property of the estate that is used to pay creditors. “Property of the estate” is a defined term under the Bankruptcy Code, so a disputed question in many cases is: What assets are, in fact, available to creditors?

Once a Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge of personal debts, creditors are enjoined from taking action to collect, recover, or offset such debts. However, unlike personal debts, liens held by secured creditors “ride through” bankruptcy. The underlying debt secured by the lien may be extinguished, but as long as the lien is valid it survives the bankruptcy.

In several Commonwealth jurisdictions, the corporate legislation allows creditors to petition a court to order the winding up of a debtor in circumstances where that debtor is unable to pay its debts as they fall due. Such legislation generally presumes that the debtor is insolvent if it has failed to comply with a statutory notice requiring the debtor to pay a certain debt within a given period of time (a statutory demand).