On 9 November 2017, in a rare example of a contested recognition hearing, His Honour Judge Paul Matthews granted recognition of Agrokor’s extraordinary administration (EA) as a foreign main proceeding under the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (CBIR).

On 24 October 2017 the Court of Appeal handed down its decision in what has become known as the Waterfall IIA and B litigation (Burlington Loan Management Limited and others v Lomas and others [2017] EWCA Civ 1462). The decision also covered an appeal of one point from the High Court Waterfall IIC decision.

Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

In Re Lehman Brothers Europe Ltd (in administration) [2017] EWHC 2031 (Ch) a proposal by joint administrators to appoint a director to a company already in administration (LBEL), in order to distribute surplus funds to its sole member (Lehman Brothers Holdings plc (LBH)), as opposed to a creditor, was held to be legally permissible, as well as pragmatic and beneficial.

In a decision that will be welcomed both by second-ranking secured creditors and by administrators, the Court of Appeal recently held that a second-ranking floating charge (SRFC) was still capable of being a qualifying floating charge for the purposes of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 despite the earlier crystallisation of a prior-ranking floating charge (PRFC). In addition, the SRFC was capable of being enforceable notwithstanding the fact that there were no assets of the chargor which were not covered by the PRFC.

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

On January 17, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., 1 ruling that Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (the “Act”), prohibits only non-consensual amendments to core payment terms of bond indentures.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.¹  The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles.  GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.

Much time is spent by MLAs and Sponsors negotiating the list of unanimous lender decisions in a leveraged finance syndicated facilities agreement. The Sponsor will be concerned that its portfolio company should not find itself "held to ransom" on a waiver request by a dissenting minority lender. On the other hand, lenders require certain fundamental transaction terms to be entrenched so that key decisions cannot be taken without them. Commonly, changes which would increase the facilities, reduce the margin or extend the final repayment date will require the consent of all lenders.