In several Commonwealth jurisdictions, the corporate legislation allows creditors to petition a court to order the winding up of a debtor in circumstances where that debtor is unable to pay its debts as they fall due. Such legislation generally presumes that the debtor is insolvent if it has failed to comply with a statutory notice requiring the debtor to pay a certain debt within a given period of time (a statutory demand).

The Australian Government has introduced new laws which are intended to avoid unnecessary corporate insolvencies in light of the challenges presented by the unfolding COVID-19 global pandemic. The new laws came into effect on 25 March 2020 and include:

Just in time for the Chinese New Year, a Hong Kong court has taken a major step forward in the developing law on cross-border insolvency by recognizing a mainland Chinese liquidation for the first time. In the Joint and Several Liquidators of CEFC Shanghai International Group Ltd [2020] HKCFI 167, Mr. Justice Harris granted recognition and assistance to mainland administrators in Hong Kong so they could perform their functions and protect assets held in Hong Kong from enforcement.

Just in time for Chinese New Year, a Hong Kong court has taken a major step forward in the developing law on cross-border insolvency by recognising a mainland Chinese liquidation for the first time. InJoint and Several Liquidators of CEFC Shanghai International Group Ltd [2020] HKCFI 167, Mr Justice Harris granted recognition and assistance to mainland administrators in Hong Kong so they could perform their functions and protect assets held in Hong Kong from enforcement.

In yet another of the many cases against Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) trustees for their alleged responsibility for losses suffered by investors, Judge Jesse Furman of the Southern District of New York precluded inquiry into the conduct of the trustee where a bankruptcy plan intervened. The plaintiffs were caught in a bind. Alleging misfeasance by the trustee prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case would have been barred by the statute of limitations. Allegations of misfeasance subsequent to the commencement of the case were swept away by confirmation of the plan.

The bankruptcy of Energy Future Holdings has spawned numerous decisions in the various segments of its Chapter 11 case. Yet another such decision was handed down by the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware in March of this year, in which the court addressed the question of what constitutes collateral, and proceeds of collateral, in a complex Chapter 11 reorganization.

The Bankruptcy Code limits in many ways the rights of nondebtors under contracts with a debtor in bankruptcy. There are, however, some crucial exceptions, which Congress deemed important for the orderly function of the securities markets. In particular, agreements governing securities repurchase (or repo) transactions involving a financial institution may be terminated and liquidated notwithstanding the bankruptcy filing of the repo seller.

A recent case in New York State Supreme Court, One Williams Street Capital Management LP v. U.S. Education Loan Trust IV, LLC (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. May 15, 2015), affords a useful opportunity to review the applicability and scope of §13-107 of the New York General Obligations Law, which provides that a transfer of a bond “vests in the transferee all claims or demands of the transferrer.” The court observed that §13-107 extends to all claims, whether in contract or in tort, including fraud.

Indentures and other agreements governing complex, multitiered structured debt products will typically contain a series of reserves, the adequacy of whose funding will take precedence over payments to noteholders. While the funding requirements of the reserve accounts will be set forth in the agreement, the formulation of these provisions will leave administrators considerable leeway in determining the cash maintenance levels appropriate for the various accounts. In a recent case, UMB National Association v. Airplanes Limited (S.D.N.Y.

Unlike an opinion, an order of the court is often not from the pen of the judge. Typically, a court order is submitted to the judge after negotiation among the parties. So, when a disagreement arises among the parties regarding the interpretation of the court’s order, how does the judge who signed the order go about resolving the matter? The issue came up not long ago in Outer Harbor Terminal LLC (Bkr. D. Del. May, 5, 2017), in which Judge Laurie Silverstein of the District of  Delaware bankruptcy court was confronted with a dispute over her own final DIP order.