The Hong Kong Court of Appeal has finally laid to rest the vexed issue of whether an arbitration agreement or a winding-up petition should take precedence in an insolvency situation. In two parallel decisions, the Court of Appeal ruled that an arbitration agreement should be treated in the same way as an exclusive jurisdiction clause and that the principle should be given a wide interpretation.

The Singapore High Court has again confirmed that a winding-up application concerning a disputed debt that is subject to an arbitration agreement will be dismissed if the arbitration agreement is prima facie valid and covers the dispute. This prima facie standard of review was first formulated three years ago by the Singapore Court of Appeal in AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Company) [2020] SCGA 33.

Three recent Hong Kong first instance court decisions have left undecided the question of whether a winding-up petition will trump an agreement to arbitrate when it comes to a winding-up and particularly in the context of cross-claims. A Court of Final Appeal decision this spring had seemed to provide pointers that the parties' agreement would be upheld but the issue – particularly when it comes to unmeritorious and late arbitration applications – is dividing the courts.

A Hong Kong court has stayed a petition presented on the just and equitable ground to arbitration, on the basis of arbitration agreements found within what the petitioner described as quasi-partnership agreements formed in 2007. The court also dismissed claims that the appointed arbitrator lacked the requisite qualifications and experience, and that a stay would lead to further costs and duplication of resources.

The Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 has brought much needed clarity to the legal basis and scope of the so-called ‘reflective loss’ principle. The effect of the decision is a ‘bright line’ rule that bars claims by shareholders for loss in value of their shares arising as a consequence of the company having suffered loss, in respect of which the company has a cause of action against the same wrong-doer.

In several Commonwealth jurisdictions, the corporate legislation allows creditors to petition a court to order the winding up of a debtor in circumstances where that debtor is unable to pay its debts as they fall due. Such legislation generally presumes that the debtor is insolvent if it has failed to comply with a statutory notice requiring the debtor to pay a certain debt within a given period of time (a statutory demand).

A recent decision of the High Court of New Zealand provides helpful guidance for insolvency practitioners on how aspects of the voluntary administration regime should operate in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

On 30 March 2020, the board of directors of EncoreFX (NZ) Limited resolved to appoint administrators to the company. By then, New Zealand was already at Level 4 on the four-level alert system for COVID-19.

The UK Court of Appeal has held that legal privilege outlasts the dissolution of a company in Addlesee v Dentons Europe LLP [2019] EWCA Civ 1600.

Legal advice privilege applies to communications between a client and its lawyers. The general rule is that those communications cannot be disclosed to third parties unless and until the client waives the privilege.

The High Court in DHC Assets Ltd v Arnerich [2019] NZHC 1695 recently considered an application under s 301 of the Companies Act (the Act) seeking to recover $1,088,156 against the former director of a liquidated company (Vaco). The plaintiff had a construction contract with Vaco and said it had not been paid for all the work it performed under that contract.

Regan v Brougham [2019] NZCA 401 clarifies what is needed to establish a valid guarantee.

A Term Loan Agreement was entered into whereby Christine Regan and Mark Tuffin lent $50,000 to B & R Enterprises Ltd. Rachael Dey and Bryce Brougham were named as Guarantors. Bryce Brougham was the only guarantor to sign the agreement. The Company was put into liquidation and a demand made against the Guarantor.

The guarantor argued that the guarantee was not enforceable based on the following: