In this Australian case, a major creditor of the company in question alleged that it was involved in phoenix activity and offered to fund a public examination of the director provided that the creditor's solicitors would act for the liquidators in that examination.  The liquidators refused the offer and, in response, the creditor applied to have the liquidators removed.

In Fielding v The Burnden Group Limited (BGL) the English High Court dismissed an application for the liquidator to be held personally liable for the costs of a successful appeal against the rejection of a proof of debt.

In the UK case of CFL Finance Limited v Rubin and Ors, a creditor had sought to make an individual bankrupt. A creditors' meeting was held.  At the meeting, a proposal for an Individual Voluntary Arrangement was approved by the creditor that held the largest portion of debt (and therefore 90.43% of the vote).  The other two creditors voted against the proposal.

In this English case, a secured lender (Nationwide) appointed administrators to three companies. However, before appointing, Nationwide had:

In Day v The Official Assignee as Liquidator of GN Networks Ltd (in Liq) [2016] NZHC 2400, the High Court rejected a claim that the funding arrangement at issue constituted maintenance or champerty.

In recent years, constructively fraudulent transfer claims asserted in bankruptcy cases, especially those arising from LBOs and similar shareholder transactions, have hit a major road block.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently issued an opinion that addresses, among other issues, the question of whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code preempts certain fraudulent transfer avoidance actions brought under state law. In re Physiotherapy Holdings Inc., No. 15-51238 (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2016).

Parties to all legal proceedings - including bankruptcy proceedings - are entitled to Constitutionally protected due process rights, including reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. In the bankruptcy context, the debtor must give known creditors reasonable notice of certain critical events, including the sale of the debtor’s assets and the deadline to file claims against the debtor.

The Bankruptcy Code sets forth the relative priority of claims against a debtor and the waterfall in which such claims are typically paid. In order for a court to confirm a plan over a dissenting class of creditors – what is commonly called a “cram-down” – the Bankruptcy Code demands thateither (i) the dissenting class receives the full value of its claim, or (ii) no classes junior to that class receive any property under the plan on account of their junior claims or interests. This is known as the “absolute priority rule.”