As discussed in our prior blog entitled “New York’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Proposals,”[1] three bills were introduced in the New York state legislature to overhaul the way sovereign debt restructurings are handled in New York. Those bills sought to implement a comprehensive mechanism for restructuring sovereign debt, limit recovery on certain sovereign debt claims, and amend the champerty defense.

The first half of 2023 witnessed the failure of three financial institutions in quick succession—Silicon Valley Bank (March 10, 2023), Signature Bank (March 12, 2023), and First Republic Bank (May 1, 2023). This was the first time three financial institutions failed in such a compressed time period since the Great Recession of 2008.

On October 17, 2022, Justice Andrea Masley of the NY Supreme Court issued a decision and order denying all but one of the motion to dismiss claims filed by Boardriders, Oaktree Capital (an equity holder, term lender, and “Sponsor” under the credit agreement), and an ad hoc group of lenders (the “Participating Lenders”) that participated in an “uptiering” transaction that included new money investments and roll-ups of existing term loan debt into new priming debt that would sit at the top of the company’s capital structure.

On October 14, 2022, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Ultra Petroleum, granting favorable outcomes to “unimpaired” creditors that challenged the company’s plan of reorganization and argued for payment (i) of a ~$200 million make-whole and (ii) post-petition interest at the contractual rate, not the Federal Judgment Rate. At issue on appeal was the Chapter 11 plan proposed by the “massively solvent” debtors—Ultra Petroleum Corp. (HoldCo) and its affiliates, including subsidiary Ultra Resources, Inc.

The saga of the first Ultra Petroleum Corp. chapter 11 cases appears to have finally come to an end. Numerous articles have been written on the tortured history of whether certain creditors of Ultra Petroleum are entitled to payment of their contractually mandated Make-Whole Amount and default rate of interest.

On July 6, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Craig T. Goldblatt issued a memorandum opinion in the bankruptcy cases of TPC Group, Inc., growing the corpus of recent court decisions tackling “uptiering” and other similar transactions that have been dubbed by some practitioners and investors as “creditor-on-creditor violence.” This topic has been a hot button issue for a few years, playing out in a number of high profile scenarios, from J.Crew and Travelport to Serta Simmons and TriMark, among others.

1. State of the Restructuring Market

1.1 Market Trends and Changes

State of the Restructuring and Insolvency Market

There were 27,359 insolvencies in France as of the end of September 2021, down 25.1% from the same period in 2020, and down 47.9% from September 2019. Such reduction is relatively stable across all sectors, including those most severely affected by the health-related restrictions, such as accommodation and food services (down 44.2% year-on-year) and trade (down 28.1% year on year).

Fewer Insolvencies for More Opportunities

At the end of 2021, corporate bankruptcies (for most company sizes and in most sectors) were at their lowest level compared to the pre-COVID-19 figures from 2019, with a 50% drop in insolvency proceedings and a 10% decrease in pre-insolvency situations. This was largely due to the temporary impact of government emergency measures and support, including:

On August 26, 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code does not require subordination agreements to be strictly enforced in order for a court to confirm a cramdown plan, so long as the plan does not discriminate unfairly.

In the past several years, the United States has seen a tidal wave of retail sector chapter 11 cases. The end result for most of those cases has been going out of business and liquidation sales. On March 11, 2020, Modell’s Sporting Goods commenced its chapter 11 cases seeking to follow a similar path taken by other retailers by closing all 153 sporting goods stores in a controlled liquidation. Unfortunately for Modell’s, the COVID-19 crisis hit the United States just as Modell’s commenced its liquidation.