Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

On October 17, 2022, Justice Andrea Masley of the NY Supreme Court issued a decision and order denying all but one of the motion to dismiss claims filed by Boardriders, Oaktree Capital (an equity holder, term lender, and “Sponsor” under the credit agreement), and an ad hoc group of lenders (the “Participating Lenders”) that participated in an “uptiering” transaction that included new money investments and roll-ups of existing term loan debt into new priming debt that would sit at the top of the company’s capital structure.

On October 14, 2022, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Ultra Petroleum, granting favorable outcomes to “unimpaired” creditors that challenged the company’s plan of reorganization and argued for payment (i) of a ~$200 million make-whole and (ii) post-petition interest at the contractual rate, not the Federal Judgment Rate. At issue on appeal was the Chapter 11 plan proposed by the “massively solvent” debtors—Ultra Petroleum Corp. (HoldCo) and its affiliates, including subsidiary Ultra Resources, Inc.

On July 6, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Craig T. Goldblatt issued a memorandum opinion in the bankruptcy cases of TPC Group, Inc., growing the corpus of recent court decisions tackling “uptiering” and other similar transactions that have been dubbed by some practitioners and investors as “creditor-on-creditor violence.” This topic has been a hot button issue for a few years, playing out in a number of high profile scenarios, from J.Crew and Travelport to Serta Simmons and TriMark, among others.

In our last blogpost (here) we reported how the court had, for the first time, exercised its power under s. 901C(4) Companies Act 2006 to exclude a company’s members and all but one class of its creditors from voting on a restructuring plan under Part 26A. The facts of this case are set out in more detail in that blogpost.

Summary

For the first time, the court has exercised its power under s. 901C(4) Companies Act 2006 to exclude a company’s members and all but one class of its creditors from voting on a restructuring plan under Part 26A. The court was satisfied that only one class of creditors had a genuine economic interest in the company and noted that “this was not a marginal case”.

Key drivers for the court’s decision (see more detail below) were:

There has been much debate in recent years around the use made of certain UK restructuring tools – the company voluntary arrangement and, more recently, the new restructuring plan – to restructure commercial property leases. Commercial tenants argue that compromise is necessary to address high fixed costs that are no longer sustainable, but landlords have often been critical of the approach taken. This debate has become more acute in the context of the pandemic, as many High Street businesses subject to mandatory closure have built up significant rent arrears that need to be addressed.

There has been much debate in recent years around the use made of certain UK restructuring tools – the company voluntary arrangement and, more recently, the new restructuring plan – to restructure commercial property leases. Commercial tenants argue that compromise is necessary to address high fixed costs that are no longer sustainable, but landlords have often been critical of the approach taken. This debate has become more acute in the context of the pandemic, as many High Street businesses subject to mandatory closure have built up significant rent arrears that need to be addressed.

On August 26, 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code does not require subordination agreements to be strictly enforced in order for a court to confirm a cramdown plan, so long as the plan does not discriminate unfairly.